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The New York Pharmaceutical Cost
Transparency Act
HOW A NARROW VIEW OF THE PRESCRIPTION
DRUG PRICING PUZZLE RENDERS A WELL-
INTENTIONED BILL IRRATIONAL
INTRODUCTION
What is the cost of innovation? Is there a fixed dollar
and cents amount for each instance in which a person is able to
complete an everyday task pain-free, or with less pain than
before? Can a numerical value be assessed for reducing the
mental stress that often accompanies disease? There are no quick
answers to these questions, and many people would instinctively
answer the latter two in the negative, yet, pharmaceutical
companies constantly attach a price to innovation and therapeutic
value. Both these hypothetical figures, along with a multitude of
other relevant factors,1 are included in the ultimate pricing of a
new drug. No one factor is dispositive of the overall value of a
drug, and certain aspects can be more readily quantified and
monetized than others. For instance, while patient benefit is an
inherently elusive attribute on which to fix a price, research and
development (R&D) expenditure is a far more tangible factor that
informs pricing strategy. Much like the value of a drug’s efficacy,
however, a pharmaceutical company’s R&D spend for a particular
drug tells merely part of a far more complex pricing story.
Despite the intricate reality of pharmaceutical pricing,
public furor has increasingly mounted over the rising cost of
prescription drugs, reaching a fever pitch in recent years as a
number of new drugs’ prices per pill or treatment cycle have
received especially intense criticism from patients,2 media
1 See infra Part I.
2 The feeling of helplessness by the general public is apparently such that
“a . . . [recent] poll shows that, overall, 87% of the public supports allowing the federal
government to negotiate prices for the Medicare Part D program.” Ed Silverman, How
High? The Backlash over Rising Prescription Drug Prices Gains Steam, WALL ST. J. (July
21, 2015), http://blogs.wsj.com/pharmalot/2015/07/21/how-high-the-backlash-over-rising-
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pundits,3 and physicians.4 In response to such concerns, on May
13, 2015, New York State Senator Ruben Diaz introduced New
York State Senate Bill 5338A5—coined the New York
Pharmaceutical Cost Transparency Act (NYPCTA).6 The bill’s
goal is to “bring transparency to an area of health care
spending that for too long has been hidden from the public.”7 It
would achieve that goal by requiring drug makers to disclose to
the New York State Department of Health, for any drug with a
“wholesale acquisition cost of ten thousand dollars ($10,000) or
more annually,”8 the total costs for:
production; research and development; clinical trials and other
regulatory costs; materials, manufacturing and administration; costs
paid by other entities, including federal, state or other governmental
programs; other costs to acquire the drug; total marketing and
advertising costs; a cumulative annual history of the average
wholesale price; total profits derived from the sale of the drug; and
the total amount of financial assistance provided by the
manufacturer, if available.9
Prior to the final submission to the state health department, the
requested figures must be audited by an independent third party
at the expense of the submitting drug company.10 Through such
transparency, the public would “have access to the information
prescription-drug-prices-gains-steam/ [https://perma.cc/UXP2-3PG7]. The poll spanned
both political affiliations and generational age groups, indicating the widespread
nature of the sentiment it uncovered. Id.
3 The New York Times, in particular, has been consistent in taking the
pharmaceutical industry to task for perceived predatory pricing. See generally Ezekiel J.
Emanuel, I Am Paying for Your Expensive Medicine, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2015), http://www.
nytimes.com/2015/11/08/opinion/sunday/i-am-paying-for-your-expensive-medicine.html
[https://perma.cc/93GR-XHR8] (urging government intervention in drug price
regulation because pharmaceutical companies are unlikely to self-regulate); No
Justification for High Drug Prices, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/
2015/12/20/opinion/sunday/no-justification-for-high-drug-prices.html [https://perma.cc/WK6
R-ZKXT] (decrying various high-profile instances of egregious price hikes).
4 See Silverman, supra note 2 (In one recent instance of mounting physician
anger, “a group of prominent doctors have gone public with complaints that Vertex
Pharmaceuticals is overcharging for . . . ground-breaking medicines that combat cystic
fibrosis. . . . [F]or the past three years, they held a private and largely fruitless
dialogue . . . and are now airing their accusations out of frustration.”).
5 See S. 5338A, 2015–2016 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2015).
6 Id. Just over a month later, in June 2015, an identical bill, sponsored by
Assemblyman Michael Blake, was introduced onto the floor of the New York State
Assembly for debate and approval. See Assemb. A8265, 2015 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2015).
7 N.Y. S. 5338A.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id.
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that supposedly justifies the cost”11 of those prescription drugs
with “outrageous price tag[s].”12
Senator Diaz’s proposal is just one of several exceedingly
similar, if not identical,13 pieces of legislation introduced in
various states across the country,14 further underscoring the sense
that the nation is fed up with exorbitantly—and seemingly
arbitrarily—priced drugs pressed upon a vulnerable populace
only to line the pockets of greedy pharmaceutical companies. And
while the NYPCTA’s ends are indeed admirable and important—
since patients, payers, and physicians are certainly entitled to a
better understanding of what drives a drug’s price tag—its means
are problematic because the cost disclosures it requires are not
representative15 of the true value of the vast majority, if any at all,
of prescription pharmaceuticals being marketed and sold today.
These limitations would implant a skewed assumption in the
heads of an already uninformed public, and any ‘transparency’
the bill created would only serve to further vilify pharmaceutical
companies, which, regardless of public backlash, would be
unlikely to reconsider pricing strategies in the face of legislation
that so wholly misrepresented the actual framework presently
utilized to determine a new drug’s proper price point.
This note argues that the NYCPTA, while a noble
consumer protection effort, is—or, at least, is perilously close to—
an unconstitutional and impermissible regulation of economic
activity by a state because its classification of pharmaceutical
companies and subsequent transparency requirements are not
rationally related to its legitimate goal of actually effecting drug
price transparency.16 Part I of the note probes deeply into the
11 Id.
12 See id.
13 See H.B. 3486, 78th Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2015) (Oregon
pharmaceutical price transparency bill presented to state House of Representatives on
March 11, 2015); Assemb. B. 463, 2015–2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015) (Assembly bill
introduced to California Legislature on February 23, 2015).
14 Ed Silverman, Angry over Drug Prices, More States Push Bills for Pharma
to Disclose Costs, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 24, 2015), http://blogs.wsj.com/pharmalot/2015/04/
24/angry-over-drug-prices-more-states-push-bills-for-pharma-to-disclose-costs/ [https://
perma.cc/D3TF-UX3C] (“Over the past several weeks, lawmakers in a handful of states
stretching from California to Massachusetts have introduced bills in a bid to force the
pharmaceutical industry to conduct an economic striptease.”).
15 “[T]he bill ‘only focuses on the medicines that make it to market, while
completely ignoring the 90% that fail during testing, a costly yet vital part of
discovering new treatments.’” Thomas Sullivan, New York Introduces Pharmaceutical
Cost Transparency Bill, POLICY & MED. (May 18, 2015), http://www.policymed.com/201
5/05/new-york-introduces-pharmaceutical-cost-transparency-bill.html [https://perma.cc/
97Y7-64BY].
16 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)
(“The general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if
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factors and influences that converge when setting a prescription
drug’s price to illustrate how, because the costs associated with
bringing a drug to market tell only a fraction of that drug’s true
pricing story, pharmaceutical companies will be completely
undeterred by any public outcry resulting from this enhanced
“transparency.” Ironically, while the bill purports only to educate
an uninformed public,17 its implicit goal of shaming pharmaceutical
companies into lowering prescription drug prices through negative
publicity18 is its only truly transparent feature. Part II discusses
the constitutional violation that could override the bill: it fails the
rational basis standard applied to government regulation of
businesses. Regardless of the NYPCTA’s possible ulterior motive
to serve as a “shame bill,” its stated purpose is to provide the
public with “access to the information that supposedly justifies
the cost” of a drug.19 The bill’s fundamental misunderstanding
of the pharmaceutical pricing landscape, however, renders its
purported solution to ever-rising pharmaceutical prices
essentially toothless in this fight. Because its means are wholly
insufficient to achieve its stated end, the legislation as proposed is
an irrational attempt at prescription drug price reform. Finally,
Part III will advocate some simple amendments to the NYPCTA
that, if implemented, would more accurately represent the
cumulative factors present within a drug’s price, better educate
the public on these elements of drug pricing, and bolster the
legislation to a point at which it is a rational means of achieving
its well-intentioned and legitimate goal.
I. PRICING PRESCRIPTION PHARMACEUTICALS
The New York Pharmaceutical Cost Transparency Act
proffers the inference that pharmaceutical prices should be tied,
more or less, directly to the R&D, manufacturing, marketing,
and administrative costs associated with launching a new drug
and maintaining yearly production and sales.20 While R&D
expenditure is arguably the factor most analyzed by and most
the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state
interest.”).
17 See N.Y. S. 5338A.
18 “Such disclosures might shame companies into restraining their price
increases and provide state officials with information to determine what action to take.”
Runaway Drug Prices, N.Y. TIMES (May 5, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/05/
opinion/runaway-drug-prices.html [https://perma.cc/W8HL-5TYA].
19 N.Y. S. 5338A.
20 See id.
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compelling to companies in determining a drug’s price tag,21
there are other, less visible aspects of both a drug itself and
standard pharmaceutical industry practices that are pertinent
to the pricing equation. These factors are hidden from the
public by the NYPCTA’s rigid disclosure requirements centered
primarily on development costs. The result is that the bill
seemingly views drug pricing with blinders rather than with
the holistic inquisitiveness the issue merits. The following
Section focuses on some of these ignored factors and highlights
how their omissions render the NYPCTA deficient as a means
to inject the drug pricing process with actual transparency.
A. “Pricing In” R&D Failures
Perhaps the most glaring and defined limitation to the
NYPCTA is the simple fact that pharmaceutical companies factor
far more than just the total production costs associated with a
specific drug into its pricing.22 Drug companies must also recoup
their expenditures on compounds that failed in clinical trials and
will never reach the market.23 For every drug that successfully
gains approval by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), its
makers have incurred tremendous costs on numerous attempts
to derive therapeutic value from other drugs where there either
was none to extract or where the drug’s dangers exceeded its
benefits.24 When this happens, the pharmaceutical company
suffers a loss on most, if not all, of the resources expended on
21 “[T]he value of medicines, contrary to most other products and
commodities, is in . . . the years of R&D that goes into them, rather than the substance
itself,” among other factors. Chris Lo, Drug Prices: Profits Before Patients?, PHARM.-
TECH.COM (June 9, 2014), http://www.pharmaceutical-technology.com/features/feature
drug-prices-profits-before-patients-4285101/ [https://perma.cc/S79J-H7WX].
22 See Ifrad Islam, Rising Cost of Drugs: Where Do We Go From Here?, HEALTH
AFFAIRS BLOG (Aug. 31, 2015), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/08/31/rising-cost-of-
drugs-where-do-we-go-from-here/ [https://perma.cc/839K-GHRN] (“While research and
development can indeed carry large costs and span multiple years, there is simply more
to pricing drugs.”).
23 See Barry Werth, A Tale of Two Drugs, MIT TECH. REVIEW (Oct. 22, 2013),
http://www.technologyreview.com/featuredstory/520441/a-tale-of-two-drugs/ [https://perma.c
c/BV6Z-CP86] (“Drug companies insist that they need to make billions of dollars on their
medicines because their failure rate is so high and because they need to convince investors it
is wise to sink money into research.”).
24 “If a review by FDA physicians and scientists shows the drug’s benefits
outweigh its known risks and the drug can be manufactured in a way that ensures a quality
product, the drug is approved and can be marketed in the United States.” What Is the
Approval Process for a New Prescription Drug?, U.S. FOOD&DRUG ADMIN. (May 12, 2016),
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/Transparency/Basics/ucm194949.htm [https://perma.cc/YL94
-QY5Y].
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testing the drug up until its failure.25 For smaller companies
with few, if any, approved products on the market, a clinical
trial failure can have catastrophic effects on investor
confidence and the firm’s stock price.26 The industry operates
based upon the knowledge that “[m]ost new drugs don’t succeed,
and companies depend on the ‘hits’ to stay profitable.”27 By
overlooking, or simply failing to mention, this fundamental reality
of the pharmaceutical industry, the NYPCTA obscures to the
public both the mammoth effort and price actually required to
bring a drug from the lab to the market, which includes meeting
the daunting regulatory standards of the FDA.
1. The Costs of Bringing a Drug to Market
The FDA has devised a stringent approval process that
a drug must complete before it can be marketed, prescribed,
and, ultimately delivered to a consumer in the United States.28
An arm of the FDA, the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research
(CDER), serves as the agency’s primary “consumer watchdog”29 to
ensure the safety and efficacy of a new drug.30 While the CDER is
the ultimate gatekeeper over whether a drug is approved for sale,
it does not oversee the various clinical trials that generate the
data on which the center makes it ruling; that expense is borne
directly by a drug’s developers.31
25 “A big pharmaceutical company carries that weight of failure, with both its
successes and its failures on the books.” Matthew Herper, The Cost of Creating a New
Drug Now $5 Billion, Pushing Big Pharma to Change, FORBES (Aug. 11, 2013), http://
www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2013/08/11/how-the-staggering-cost-of-inventing-
new-drugs-is-shaping-the-future-of-medicine/ [https://perma.cc/8AY5-C2T6].
26 A recent example of a clinical trial failure leading to near financial ruin
can be found in the case of drug maker Chimerix. Following the Phase 3 clinical trial
failure of brincidofovir, its candidate for FDA approval as a treatment for a variety of
viruses, “Chimerix’s stock plunged on the news, dropping more than 81 percent” by
mid-afternoon after the trial results were announced. Frank Vinluan, Chimerix Stock
Plunges After Anti-Infection Drug Fails Phase 3 Trial, XCONOMY (Dec. 28, 2015),
http://www.xconomy.com/raleigh-durham/2015/12/28/chimerix-stock-plunges-after-anti-
infection-drug-fails-phase-3-trial/ [https://perma.cc/MN37-D9D3].
27 Scott Gavura, Legislators Want “Pharmaceutical Cost Transparency.” Are
They Asking the Wrong Question?, SCI.-BASED MED. (May 21, 2015), https://www.science
basedmedicine.org/legislators-want-pharmaceutical-cost-transparency-are-they-asking-
the-wrong-question/ [https://perma.cc/D7MX-NY3M].
28 Development & Approval Process (Drugs), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/default.htm [https://perma.cc/
L53T-46JJ] (“American consumers benefit from having access to the safest and most
advanced pharmaceutical system in the world.”).
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.
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The process begins with a preclinical investigation of a
drug’s therapeutic capabilities. If—after preliminary laboratory
analysis—the pharmaceutical company believes it has a
potentially marketable drug on its hands, it will proceed to
clinical trials,32 which mandate the drug’s successful completion of
three progressive trial phases—Phases 1, 2, and 3.33 Each phase is
designed to meet certain clinical endpoints generally related to
the safety, efficacy, and proper dosing of the drug, and the
population of enrolled patients increases, usually substantially, in
each successive trial.34 As the scope of each clinical trial phase
grows, so too does the overall cost and duration of the
development cycle.35 Importantly, with the advent of each phase,
the larger patient population carries heightened risk that adverse
side effects previously undetected in the earlier, smaller cohort
will be uncovered. There is also the possibility that the drug’s
preliminarily significant efficacy was merely the result of a
statistical anomaly within the earlier sample and not transferable
to a larger, more representative test group. Thus, the probability
of the drug meeting the clinical endpoints required to continue its
advance towards FDA approval declines.36 These risks materialize
simultaneously as the trial costs mount and the company’s time
investment in the drug grows ever longer.
The average cost of bringing a prescription drug to market
is a controversial topic, and different, albeit interested, parties
advance estimates that vary widely from one another.37 In late
2014, the Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development
(CSDD) released a comprehensive report listing the projected
total cost of obtaining FDA approval for a prescription
32 Prior to the initiation of human testing during the phased clinical trials, a
drug’s developer “must first file an investigational new drug application (IND) with the
FDA.” Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development
Costs, 22 J.HEALTHECONS. 151, 155–56 (2003).
33 Development & Approval Process (Drugs), supra note 28.
34 The Drug Development and Approval Process, FDAREVIEW.ORG, http://www.
fdareview.org/approval_process.shtml [https://perma.cc/PE83-H8C7] (fig. 1).
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 CompareMatthew Herper, The Truly Staggering Cost of Inventing New Drugs,
FORBES (Feb. 10, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2012/02/10/the-truly-
staggering-cost-of-inventing-new-drugs/2/ [https://perma.cc/K3ZP-RZ6T] (“The average drug
developed by a major pharmaceutical company costs at least $4 billion, and it can be as
much as $11 billion.”), with Aaron E. Carroll, $2.6 Billion to Develop a Drug? New Estimate
Makes Questionable Assumptions, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/
2014/11/19/upshot/calculating-the-real-costs-of-developing-a-new-drug.html?_r=0 [https://
perma.cc/3H2C-HR4S] (“In 2010, a systematic review of studies that looked at the cost of
drug development was published in Health Policy. The review found thirteen articles, with
estimates ranging from $161 million to $1.8 billion (in 2009 dollars).”).
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pharmaceutical at $2.558 billion.38 The report measured the total
development timeframe during which these costs are incurred to
be over a decade.39 The last such major study done by the CSDD,
in 2003, offered a figure less than half of its current estimate;40
this cost difference has, predictably, inspired criticism of the
study’s methods and motivations. The study concludes that the
two primary elements of a drug’s developmental price tag “are
average out-of-pocket outlays of $1.395 billion and ‘time costs’ of
$1.163 billion, reflecting returns investors forgo while a drug is in
development.”41 Crucially, the CSDD also factored into its estimate
the cost of therapies that failed at some point, either pre-trial or in
one of the trial phases, during the development process.42 The
study directly “links the costs of unsuccessful projects to those that
are successful in obtaining marketing approval from regulatory
authorities” and concludes that such R&D failures are a primary
reason for rising drug costs.43
Criticism of the CSDD’s study centers primarily on the
accusation that the exorbitant drug development cost estimate
provides ample justification to pharmaceutical companies to
price their products with impunity.44 Advocates of the study
seem to not expressly disagree with this assessment;45 although,
presumably, such proponents believe in the validity of the
estimate and that drug pricing is an exercise in cost recoupment,
not greed. Other charges leveled against the study hone in on its
failure to account for “the impact of so-called orphan drug tax
credits, in which the US government bankrolls half the cost of
38 Robert Weisman, Cost of Bringing a Drug to Market Tops $2.5b, Research
Finds, BOS. GLOBE (Nov. 18, 2014), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2014/11/18/
cost-bringing-prescription-drug-market-tops-billion-tufts-research-center-estimates/6m
Pph8maRxzcvftWjr7HUN/story.html [https://perma.cc/6SEJ-QCTS].
39 Id.
40 Id. (“The center’s projected cost of $2.558 billion dwarfs the $802 million figure
in its last major study, done in 2003—the equivalent of $1.04 billion in 2013 dollars.”).
41 Id.
42 Id.; see also Rick Mullin, Tufts Study Finds Big Rise In Cost of Drug
Development, CHEM. & ENG’G NEWS (Nov. 20, 2014), http://cen.acs.org/articles/92/web/
2014/11/Tufts-Study-Finds-Big-Rise.html [https://perma.cc/FJ4C-BPRU] (“[T]he cost of
unsuccessful projects is figured into . . . [the] group’s analysis.”).
43 Cost to Develop and Win Approval for a New Drug Is $2.6 Billion, TUFTSCTR.
FOR THE STUDY OF DRUG DEV. (Nov. 18, 2014), http://csdd.tufts.edu/news/complete_story/
pr_tufts_csdd_2014_cost_study [https://perma.cc/LX4Z-4YJ8].
44 The director of a DC-based non-governmental organization, Knowledge
Ecology International, sniffed pretext in the study’s findings, asserting that “[t]his
estimate is not credible . . . . The only justification [it offers] for the high cost of new
drugs is research and development, and this will be used by the drug companies to get
people to accept higher prices.” Weisman, supra note 38.
45 Mullin, supra note 42 (“The value of the Tufts study is that it helps the public
understand that . . . [pharmaceutical drug development] is a high-risk, expensive, and long-
term endeavor.”).
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clinical trials that qualify.”46 Additionally, critics have derided
the CSDD’s exclusion of federally funded National Institute of
Health (NIH) grants, which fund “early-stage research into
drug compounds that are eventually sold,” from the study’s
final calculation.47 Subsidies on orphan drug development,
however, are irrelevant in estimating the cost of therapies for
diseases with large patient populations,48 and standalone NIH
grants represent a relatively small fraction of the pharmaceutical
development cost landscape.49 These criticisms are alone
inadequate to discredit the CSDD’s findings, which focus on
actual R&D costs borne by private manufacturers.50 Allegations of
bias and pretext are unsurprising in a study centered on such a
fiercely debated topic. While a certain degree of healthy
skepticism is merited,51 the study has nonetheless “been widely
cited at industry forums,”52 and the CSDD as an organization has
been generally accepted as credible by both the pharmaceutical
industry and its observers.53
Methodological and procedural controversies aside,
perhaps the study’s most compelling case for the high cost of FDA
approvals lies in its data on the failure rate of compounds in
development. Figures for the success rate of drugs gaining FDA
approval also vary, but even the industry’s critics agree that this
46 Weisman, supra note 38.
47 Id.
48 The FDA designates as an orphan drug those “drugs and biologics . . . intended
for the safe and effective treatment, diagnosis or prevention of rare diseases/disorders that
affect fewer than 200,000 people in the U.S., or that affect more than 200,000 persons but
are not expected to recover the costs of developing and marketing a treatment drug.”
Developing Products for Rare Diseases & Conditions, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/ForIndustry/DevelopingProductsforRareDiseasesConditions/ucm2005
525.htm [https://perma.cc/L8KN-3FTM] (last updated Oct. 17, 2016).
49 “[L]ate-stage [drug] development . . . is funded primarily by pharmaceutical
companies or venture capitalists with some collaborative support from government sources.”
THERESA WIZEMAN ET AL., BREAKTHROUGH BUSINESS MODELS: DRUG DEVELOPMENT FOR
RARE AND NEGLECTED DISEASES AND INDIVIDUALIZED THERAPIES: WORKSHOP SUMMARY 8
(2008) (emphasis added); see also DiMasi et al., supra note 32, at 157 (“[O]f 47 FDA-
approved drugs that had reached at least US$ 500 million in US sales in 1999, the
government had direct or indirect use or ownership patent rights to only four of them.”).
50 “This criticism distracts from the policy question, which concerns the actual
dollars spent on R&D. If there were no corporate income tax, it would not really change
what R&D contractors or drug company employees charge for their services. To improve
R&D productivity, actual costs have to be addressed.” John R. Graham, The Crisis in
Drug Research and Development, NAT’L CTR. FOR POLICY ANALYSIS (Mar. 3, 2015), http://
www.ncpa.org/pub/ib158 [https://perma.cc/7UNC-55DV].
51 “The Tufts Center is funded, to a large extent, by the pharmaceutical
industry. It is in the pharmaceutical industry’s best interests to have the public believe
that it is very expensive to develop a drug.” Carroll, supra note 37.
52 Weisman, supra note 38.
53 Despite allegations of cronyism from its critics, the CSDD is “a bellwether
figure in the drug industry.” Mullin, supra note 42.
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percentage is extremely low.54 The percentage is lower still for
truly innovative medicines with new molecular entities55 aimed
at treating complex diseases. Understanding this, the CSDD
study allocated “the cost of abandoned drugs . . . to successful
ones.”56 The abandoned drugs included in the report were not
only those compounds that failed in human clinical trials, but
also investigatory compounds discarded during pre-trial
research, which accounted for 80% of the drugs that never
made it out of development.57 Costs incurred on preliminary
research are especially hard to attribute to testing for any
specific drug.58 Nevertheless, these costs are expenditures by a
pharmaceutical company that must be recouped by those
products that do make it to market despite their decidedly
amorphous relationship to the development of an ultimately
approved product. Pharmaceutical companies should certainly
not take pride in such high failure rates, and perhaps a higher
degree of R&D efficiency could be achieved through a more
strategic and selective decision-making process in the early
stages of a drug’s development. The simple truth, however, is
that science is an art of pure trial and error, and a high rate of
failure is the price of innovation.59 Furthermore, true
innovation is what industry critics, and the public at large,
commonly claim is lacking in the field, with companies too
54 “The failure rate is high–but a successful new drug can . . . make[ ] up for a
lot of failures.” Joe Nocera, Is Valeant Pharmaceuticals the Next Enron?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
27, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/27/opinion/is-valeant-pharmaceuticals-the-ne
xt-enron.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/UTY3-4DBG]. “[O]nly about one in ten drugs
survives clinical trials to market.” Nick Stockton, How Prescription Drugs Get So Wildly
Expensive, WIRED (Sept. 23, 2015), http://www.wired.com/2015/09/prescription-drugs-get-
wildly-expensive/ [https://perma.cc/JZS4-CPYR]. In an article arguing that the CSSD
estimate is only representative of a specific subset of innovative pharmaceuticals and
not all drugs, the author nonetheless admitted that “the road to approvals is littered
with casualties.” The Price of Failure, THE ECONOMIST (Nov. 29, 2014),
http://www.economist.com/news/business/21635005-startling-new-cost-estimate-new-med
icines-met-scepticism-price-failure [https://perma.cc/DP5D-3P6A].
55 Approximately 92% of biopharmaceuticals fail in oncologic clinical trials.
ANASTASSIOS D. RETZIOS, WHY DO SO MANY PHASE 3 CLINICAL TRIALS FAIL?: PART 1:
THE EFFECT OF DEFICIENT PHASE 2 TRIALS IN THERAPEUTIC AREAS WITHHIGH FAILURE
RATES IN PHASE 3 STUDIES 3 (2010), http://www.adrclinresearch.com/Issues_in_
Clinical_Research_links/Why%20Pivotal%20Clinical%20Trials%20Fail%20-%20Part%2
01_v12L_a.pdf [https://perma.cc/VKZ7-Z8DQ].
56 Graham, supra note 50.
57 Id.
58 See id. (“[S]ubstantial expenditures incurred prior to clinical testing cannot
be directly linked to work on specific compounds.”).
59 “Compounds that appear to hit a designated target right between the eyes
still often fail to be safe and effective in animal and human studies. Biology is just way
too complicated.” Dan Hurley, Why Are So Few Blockbuster Drugs Invented Today?,
N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE (Nov. 13, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/16/magazine/
why-are-there-so-few-new-drugs-invented-today.html [https://perma.cc/7RHP-LZRY].
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often focused on developing branded ‘copycat’ drugs with fewer
obstacles to clear on the path to FDA approval.60 Innovation
and scientific advancement are not achieved free of cost, and if
drug makers are to serve the purpose that the public seems to
expect from them, they must be allowed the opportunity, when
it knocks, to see a return on the considerable investment
innovation demands.
2. Why R&D Failures Must Be Included in Cost
Calculations
The notion that pharmaceutical companies must make
back their developmental losses through sales of approved products
is fundamental to the successful functioning of the industry. Any
field in which companies rely on R&D to stay relevant and afloat in
the market must operate in such a manner. Quite simply, “[t]he
road to blockbuster drugs . . . is paved in part by well-documented,
very costly, pharmaceutical development failures.”61 In a recent
post, Derek Lowe, a PhD in organic chemistry who has worked on
the development of high-science therapies for Alzheimer’s disease,
schizophrenia, and osteoporosis,62 offered the following pertinent
real-world, hypothetical parallel to the R&D system of the
pharmaceutical industry:
If only one out of every ten cars that Ford developed—assembly lines
and all—ever made it to the showrooms, cars would be more
expensive. If only one out of every ten movies—after shooting,
production, and editing—ever made it to theaters, ticket prices
would go up. We get one . . . out of every ten drugs in the clinic to
market, and we’ve got to pay for it somehow.63
As Lowe notes, baking past failures into a current product’s
price tag is an entirely unavoidable economic reality of the
R&D model under which many other industries, besides the
60 Criticism of ‘me-too’ drugs commonly follows this line of reasoning: by
introducing into a disease category competitors that are not compellingly superior
alternatives to existing drugs, physician prescribing decisions may become more difficult,
R&D resources are exhausted on a condition for which treatments already exist, and,
“[e]ven at heavily discounted prices, brand-name drugs almost certainly cost more than
generic medications.” See Joshua J. Gagne & Niteesh K. Choudhry, How Many “Me-Too”
Drugs Is Too Many?, 305 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 711, 711 (2011).
61 Gavura, supra note 27.
62 About Derek Lowe, SCI. TRANSLATIONAL MED., http://blogs.sciencemag.org/
pipeline/about-derek-lowe [https://perma.cc/N4JX-Y8RD].
63 Derek Lowe, Shkreli, Turing, and PhRMA, SCI. TRANSLATIONAL MED. (Sept.
23, 2015), http://blogs.sciencemag.org/pipeline/archives/2015/09/23/shkreli-turing-and-
phrma [https://perma.cc/VQF6-AJEL].
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pharmaceutical sector, operate.64 By ignoring this fact, the
NYPCTA masks a fundamental aspect of drug pricing from the
public in the name of transparency.
It is true that irresponsibly investing in compounds
unlikely to ever see the daylight of FDA approval is an inefficient
burden on the consumers who will ultimately shoulder such sunk
costs.65 When the approval rate of drugs in development is
already so low, however, it becomes difficult for companies to
objectively evaluate true therapeutic potential versus a virtual
shot in the dark.66 Ideally, drug companies would act “[l]ike good
card players [and] . . . sit out many more hands than they play.”67
But in an industry where continual innovation is necessary to
remain competitive in the market, there is considerable risk in
idleness as well. Efficiency conundrums aside, one thing is certain
regardless of whether a company approaches R&D aggressively or
conservatively: some drugs will fail in development, and those
costs will have to be accounted for when another of that
company’s drugs is granted FDA approval. Any acknowledgment
of this basic industry totem is absent from the NYPCTA.
Regardless of the ultimate cost of bringing a drug to
market,68 the cost to the pharmaceutical company far exceeds
merely the R&D associated with only the launched product.
While the true pricing formula is a question of great contention,
it is undeniable that the vast majority of drugs fails either in the
laboratory69 or in clinical trials70 and will thus never turn a profit
64 Id.
65 “Sunk costs are fixed costs that firms incur to enhance the demand of its
products, typically R&D and marketing expenditures.” Market Size, Sunk Costs, and
Entry in Pharmaceutical R&D, SWITCH (Aug. 15, 2013), http://www.theswitchproject.eu/
market-size-sunk-costs-and-entry-in-pharmaceutical-rd/ [https://perma.cc/5HT6-JLG3].
66 In describing how three major drug companies expended billions of dollars
on a long-shot Alzheimer’s disease therapy that unsurprisingly failed in trials, Forbes’
Matthew Herper speculated on the corporate rationale for proceeding with clinical
trials in the first place: “The logic behind going forward probably went something like
this: Alzheimer’s is one of the world’s biggest health problems and any drug that can
impact it would be simply huge. . . . It would be crazy not to try, right?” Matthew Herper,
How a Failed Alzheimer’s Drug Illustrates the Drug Industry’s Gambling Problem,
FORBES (Aug. 8, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2012/08/08/how-a-
failed-alzheimers-drug-illustrates-the-drug-industrys-gambling-problem/.
67 Id.
68 Whether that cost is closer to $2.6 billion, see Cost to Develop and Win
Approval for New Drug Is $2.6 Billion, supra note 43; or $160 million, see Carroll,
supra note 37.
69 “Of five thousand compounds tested, approximately five will appear promising
enough to induce the company to file an Investigational New Drug Application (IND).” The
Drug Development and Approval Process, supra note 34 (fig. 1).
70 “[T]he overall success rate for drugs moving from early stage Phase I clinical
trials to FDA approval is about one in 10 . . . .” Bill Berkrot, Success Rates for Experimental
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for the private company whose investment in such drugs was
lost. Accordingly, the pricing strategy of drugs that do make it to
market must factor in the cost of the failures that came before it.
The NYPCTA does not require that these sunk costs be included
in its mandated development disclosures. Even if this exclusion
reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of industry pricing
norms or the bill knowingly seeks to educate the public on only
the expenditures associated with the specifically approved
drug, its implementation will not educate the public on the true
costs of sustainable pharmaceutical development.
At the very least, a caveat to the bill’s required disclosures
is necessary to indicate that other basic principles of economics
and corporate finance require companies to price drugs higher
than the minimum at which its R&D price tag may be recouped.
Without such a disclaimer, this important pricing factor is at risk
of being completely obscured. If implemented as currently
drafted, the bill would paint a simplistic and false picture of
industry pricing strategy: specifically, that a new drug’s price tag
reflects only those dollars spent on its development. This image
would likely further infuriate a public that, armed with its new
‘knowledge,’ must watch helplessly as drug makers continue to
price drugs at levels that account for costs absent from the
transparency bill.
B. International Pharmaceutical Pricing
While factoring clinical development failures into drug
prices is the primary and most tangible culprit behind the
inflation of pricing above merely what it costs to recoup R&D
expenditures, there are additional considerations at play in
setting a prescription drug’s stateside price. Global health needs
and international pharmaceutical consumption and cost often
dictate U.S. drug pricing strategy.71 Americans, comprising “less
than 5 percent of the world’s population, buy[ ] more than 50
percent of its prescription drugs;”72 however, they “buy[ ] them at
prices designed to subsidize the rest of the industrial world,
where the same drugs cost much less.”73
Drugs Falls: Study, REUTERS (Feb. 14, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
pharmaceuticals-success-idUSTRE71D2U920110214 [https://perma.cc/DA95-K55L].
71 SeeWerth, supra note 23.
72 Id.
73 Id. Despite American subsidization, “most poor governments can’t afford
[prescription drugs] at even those lower prices.” Id.; see also DIANA FARRELL ET AL.,
MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., ACCOUNTING FOR THE COST OF US HEALTH CARE: A NEW LOOK
AT WHY AMERICANS SPEND MORE 20 (2008), http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/health_
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This reality stems from international regulatory schemes
over which pharmaceutical companies have little to no control.74
“The United States is the only major industrialized country in
the world that does not currently regulate prescription drug
prices,”75 whereas, “[i]n Europe, drug prices are often set by
government health systems and decline over time as countries
demand additional price cuts.”76 Such a state-run system is often
the only buyer of large amounts of prescription drugs in the
country it governs, which lends it massive leverage at the
negotiating table with the pharmaceutical companies seeking to
do business within its borders.77 Accordingly, if a pharmaceutical
company wants to compete in foreign markets, it must follow
that nation’s established rules. This requires pricing its product
in accordance with a government regulating body’s imposed
price limit, which is often based on the state’s perceived worth of
the drug’s therapeutic value.78 In the United States, however,
systems_and_services/accounting_for_the_cost_of_us_health_care [https://perma.cc/Z3C
N-9HTW] (“[P]rices in the United States need to be sufficient to subsidize R&D for the
rest of the world.”); Rafi Mohammed, It’s Time to Rein in Exorbitant Pharmaceutical
Prices, HARVARD BUS. REVIEW (Sept. 22, 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/09/its-time-to-rein-in-
exorbitant-pharmaceutical-prices [https://perma.cc/7D4Y-TDQE] (“[C]onsumers in the
U.S. are stuck footing most of the bill for developing new drugs, even as consumers
throughout the developed world reap the benefits.”).
74 Mohammed, supra note 73.
75 John A. Vernon et al., The Economics of Pharmaceutical Price
Regulation and Importation: Refocusing the Debate, 32 AM. J. L. & MED. 175, 176
(2006); see also Mohammed, supra note 73 (“[V]irtually every country regulates
prices and the U.S. doesn’t.”).
76 Robert Langreth et al., The U.S. Pays a Lot More for Top Drugs Than Other
Countries, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 18, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2015-drug-
prices/ [https://perma.cc/E7UU-U8DY].
77 Jeanne Whalen, Why the U.S. Pays More Than Other Countries for Drugs,
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 1, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/why-the-u-s-pays-more-than-other-
countries-for-drugs-1448939481 [https://perma.cc/WY8F-6J84].
78 For a western European example, the Norwegian government’s process of
fixing drug prices, while disregarding the investment of the drug’s maker, is as follows:
The government controls costs in part by setting maximum prices. To do that,
it reviews prices in nine neighboring countries and takes the average of the
three lowest.
This system automatically holds prices low because the countries consulted
also have government-controlled prices.
The Norwegian Medicines Agency, or NMA, then reviews patient data to
decide whether a new drug is cost-effective. Its maker must request a
reimbursement price at or under the maximum Norway has set and submit a
detailed comparison of the drug’s cost and benefits versus existing
treatments. Companies have teams of number crunchers to produce these
comparisons, which can also prove useful in pitching products in the U.S.
Id.; see also Valerie Paris, Why Do Americans Spend So Much On Pharmaceuticals?, PBS
NEWSHOUR (Feb. 7, 2014), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/americans-spend-much-
pharmaceuticals/ [https://perma.cc/CZR9-8ZWA] (“[I]n many countries, government
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“insurers typically accept the price set by the makers for each
drug, especially when there is no competition in a therapeutic
area, and then cover the cost with high copayments.”79 The
result is a paradoxical international health care market where,
for example, prescription drug “[p]rices in Norway, the fourth
wealthiest country in the world” are lower than those in the
United States, the world’s sixth wealthiest nation.80 Whether
higher U.S. prices reflect the anticipation of losses due to lower-
priced drugs abroad or are a response to losses already sustained
in foreign markets, state-imposed price controls undeniably
complicate a drug company’s attempt to reasonably price its
product commensurate with R&D expenditures. With the
knowledge that profits will be derived primarily from the
domestic use of their products, American pharmaceutical
executives set the stateside price for new drugs accordingly.
Price controls on prescription drugs in foreign countries
result in burdens on the American consumer. “As millions of
Americans [with poor] prescription drug coverage [well
know] . . . , the ‘list prices’ they face for patented drugs when they
walk into a drug store in the United States can be much higher
than the price of drugs sold abroad.”81 Freed from the restrictions
they face abroad, pharmaceutical companies will rationally
recoup the ‘losses’ suffered internationally through higher
prices on drugs sold in the United States.
Thus, even if drug makers were not already operating at
a loss by the time a new drug hits the market due to failed
therapies and forborne opportunity costs, pricing a drug based
on the cost of its R&D alone, as the NYPCTA urges, would still
result in the American public paying a price seemingly
disproportionate to the costs of its full developmental lifecycle.
This leads logically to the conclusion that even in a utopian
health care landscape—where pharmaceutical companies
operate benevolently and seek as payment for their innovation
nothing more than those costs incurred to innovate—the
NYPCTA would still obscure relevant factors that determine a
drug’s price.
agencies essentially regulate the prices of medicines and set limits to the amount they
will reimburse; they may only agree to pay for a drug if they feel that the price is
justified by the therapeutic benefits.”).
79 Paris, supra note 78.
80 Mohammed, supra note 73.
81 Cost of Prescription Drugs, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/
NewsEvents/Testimony/ucm114800.htm [https://perma.cc/JG24-F7KQ] (statement of
Dr. Mark. B. McClellan before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation).
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C. Therapeutic Value: The Cost of Efficacy
Aside from global and domestic market economics and the
profit and loss ratios of drug companies, the inherent therapeutic
value of a prescription drug is another factor that pharmaceutical
companies use to set its price.
1. Not All Drugs Are Created Equally: The Varying
Degrees of Innovation Inherent Within Different
Drug Classes
A common criticism of the industry rests on the assertion
that companies increasingly focus more on producing ‘me-too’
drugs—“products that mimic existing treatments or offer only
incremental improvements in outcomes”82—than on developing
novel therapies.83 This allegation, however, rings hollow,
especially when leveled against the biotechnology sector,84 where
many truly groundbreaking advances in medical science
regularly occur and where more quantifiable therapeutic value
can be found.85
While in general, innovative medicines that are the most
expensive to bring to market generate higher profits than drug
makers’ other offerings,86 it is not a uniform rule that the most
efficacious therapies are the most expensive to develop. And it is
not a foregone conclusion that piggybacking on existing products
is a substantially cheaper endeavor since “the complexity of
[new] molecules makes it more difficult to even make generic
versions of these products.”87 The NYPCTA makes no distinction
between biotechnological products, which are more likely to
82 DAVID DRANOVE ET AL., KELLOGG SCH. OFMGMT., PHARMACEUTICAL PROFITS
AND THE SOCIAL VALUE OF INNOVATION 9 (2014), http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/
faculty/garthwaite/htm/medicare_pharma_innovation.pdf [https://perma.cc/JL7U-4MKJ].
83 “Critics of the pharmaceutical industry love to attack ‘me-too.’” John
LaMattina, Impact of ‘Me-Too’ Drugs on Health Care Costs, FORBES (Jan. 19, 2015),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/johnlamattina/2015/01/19/impact-of-me-too-drugs-on-health-
care-costs/#7e7347692610.
84 Biotechnology firms differ from traditional pharmaceutical companies in that
their products are primarily biologic and “far larger in size and more complex than
traditional small molecule products and cannot reasonably be fully chemically
synthesized. Instead, biologics are effectively grown from living organisms and therefore
are almost certainly not likely to be simple copies or minor modifications of existing small
molecule products.” DRANOVE ET AL., supra note 82, at 12.
85 Id. at 30 (“[N]ew products emerging from this sector are more likely to
represent some form of scientific advancement rather than only the me-too products cited
by many critics of the pharmaceutical industry.”).
86 Vernon, supra note 75, at 177 (“[T]he returns from pharmaceutical R&D come
largely in the form of revenues generated by recently launched, patented new drugs . . . .”).
87 DRANOVE ET AL., supra note 82, at 30.
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represent true innovation and should arguably be priced higher
to account for this inherent value,88 and drugs developed by
more traditional, ‘small-molecule’ pharmaceutical firms.89 In so
doing, the bill either takes for granted that R&D cost correlates
precisely with the therapeutic value of a drug, which is simply
not the reality of the industry,90 or it ignores therapeutic value
entirely. By failing to expressly include therapeutic value in its
regulatory framework, the NYPCTA again legislates broadly
based on a sweeping industry generalization. Any chance at
facilitating true pricing transparency is lost in the process.
2. Uncovering and Defining Therapeutic Value
In a free market system, private companies may price
their products at whichever level they feel is appropriate, subject,
of course, to whether or not the market will bear such cost. The
NYPCTA, accordingly, does not explicitly impose price controls,
but it does obscure relevant pricing factors. The bill recognizes
that pure, unbridled capitalism in the realm of pharmaceuticals is
an ugly, uncomfortable issue. And, to be sure, examples exist of
predatory ‘entrepreneurs’ taking advantage of the industry’s
unique ability to wholly sustain the lives of large subsets of its
most loyal customers: the sick patients reliant on the company’s
drugs.91 But a drug’s efficacy, as well as its tolerability, can
88 “The efficacy and safety of biopharmaceutical products, combined with their
ability to address previously untreatable conditions, allows pharma companies to command
high prices for innovative drugs.” Ralf Otto et al., Rapid Growth in Biopharma: Challenges
and Opportunities, MCKINSEY & CO. (Dec. 2014), http://www.mckinsey.com/industries/
pharmaceuticals-and-medical-products/our-insights/rapid-growth-in-biopharma [https://
perma.cc/Q489-W9K9].
89 See S. 5338A, 2015–2016 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2015). The bill broadly reserves its
cost disclosure requirements for those drugs with a “wholesale acquisition cost of ten
thousand dollars ($10,000) or more annually or per course of treatment.” Id. A drug’s
chemical makeup is not a factor in defining the bill’s regulatory scope.
90 The ultimate efficacy of a molecule in its intended patient population is still
unknown during clinical trials. Therefore, this speculative efficacy cannot be the driving
factor of the trials’ costs. Rather, “therapeutic area as well as number and types of clinical
procedures involved are the key drivers of costs in [clinical trials].” AYLIN SERTKAYA ET
AL., EASTERN RESEARCH GRP., INC., EXAMINATION OF CLINICAL TRIAL COSTS AND
BARRIERS FOR DRUGDEVELOPMENT 3–7 (2014), https://aspe.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/
77166/rpt_erg.pdf [https://perma.cc/9DQS-FQAG].
91 An especially egregious recent example is found in the near-universal
condemnation of hedge fund manager-turned-chief executive officer of Turing
Pharmaceuticals, and arguably the “most hated man in America,” Martin Shkreli. Janell
Ross, Martin Shkreli: A New Icon of Modern Greed, WASH. POST (Sept. 23, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/09/23/martin-shkreli-a-new-icon
-of-modern-greed/ [https://perma.cc/JG9P-K2FE]. Shkreli was widely, and deservedly,
skewered following his decision to raise the price of Daraprim, a more than six-decade-old
drug, “from $13.50 to $750” shortly after Turing acquired it. Id. Daraprim is most
commonly used to treat Toxoplasma gondii infections that afflict persons with severely
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provide very real, tangible, and transformative benefits. Beyond
the immediate value to the patient, there are also less instantly
apparent, but nonetheless undeniable, social gains that result
from a healthy populace. Pharmaceutical companies recognize
this inherent value in their products, and, after investing in the
R&D necessary to make such gains possible, are not per se
greedy robber-barons for incorporating therapeutic value into a
drug’s price.
Pricing pharmaceuticals is a complex process that takes
place within a unique market.92 On a basic level, and as opposed
to the majority of consumer goods, “sales of most branded
pharmaceuticals are not sensitive to prices or price
changes. . . . [Therefore], [o]nce launched, prices are unlikely to
decline in the face of new warnings or other information because
of the presence of brand loyalty.”93 After this loyalty is attained,
drug makers are hesitant to lower prices because “such a move
could ‘signal [to] the market or the courts that the manufacturer
accedes . . . that the drug is worth less than was initially
promised.’”94 But the mere existence of brand loyalty is arguably
indicative, wholly or in part, of either or both of a drug’s clinical
efficacy and its psychological healing component.95 Thus, the
question returns to how to quantifiably attach a figure to a
drug’s inherent value.
While a prescription drug’s therapeutic value is highly
relevant to its pricing strategy, “price and value are not always
the same.”96 Price must reflect, in addition to clinical value,
compromised immune systems, including HIV/AIDS patients. See Understanding Your
Prescription, DARAPRIM, http://www.daraprimdirect.com/patients [https://perma.cc/39HB-
KWJJ].
92 See In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. 04-MD-1596, 05-CV-4115, 05-
CV-2948, 06-CV-0021, 06-CV-6322, 2008 WL 2696916, at *31 (E.D.N.Y. July 2, 2008)
(summarizing unique attributes of pharmaceutical pricing, including the relative
inelasticity of the market).
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 “Consumers who are brand loyal are not willing to compromise drug safety and
efficacy for lower prices. A brand gives confidence to the physician regarding effectiveness.
The physician who believes the effectiveness of a certain drug will have the tendency of
prescribing it.” Çaglar Macit et al., Brand Loyalty as a Strategy for the Competition with
Generic Drugs: Physicians Perspective, 5 J. DEV. DRUGS 1,1 (2016) (footnote omitted).
96 Jane Horvath, Biopharmaceuticals: Pricing for Clinical Value and In-Market
Risk, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (Aug. 20, 2015), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/08/20/
biopharmaceuticals-pricing-for-clinical-value-and-in-market-risk/ [https://perma.cc/PW
W7-WEU3] (“It may be helpful . . . to think of a drug’s value as the clinical performance and
patient outcomes, while the price reflects both the value and the growing uncertainty
around in-market risks of market consolidation and restricted access, branded therapeutic
competition, mandatory discounts, and restrictive coverage policy.”).
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other “market risks [that] affect lifetime product revenue.”97
But prescribing physicians are concerned primarily with a
drug’s efficacy and not its price.98 To entice doctors to prescribe
their drugs, pharmaceutical companies must devise selling
strategies demonstrating that its drug offers the maximum
therapeutic value to the intended patient population and is,
therefore, the best available treatment option.99 Assuming that
a drug’s efficacy is the main driver of its sales, and drug sales
are a pharmaceutical company’s primary source of recouping
R&D costs, it follows that a drug’s price must be based, at least
in part, on its predicted sales necessary to recoup production
costs using efficacy as a primary indicator of likely physician
prescribing behavior.100 If nothing else, therefore, therapeutic
value aids drug makers in setting a floor price point at which
they will, ostensibly, see a return on their investment. This
element of the pricing strategy would be invisible to the public
under the current version of the NYPCTA.
3. Social Gains Through Disease Eradication and a
Healthy Populace
A drug’s efficacy may provide broader societal value,
which, while impossible to definitively quantify in monetary
terms, nonetheless justifies its consideration within the drug’s
pricing formula. Effective—and partially or wholly curative—
treatments today reduce or possibly nullify a patient’s medical
costs that would accrue over time through an inferior, or
merely symptom-treating, prior standard of care. These savings
are also part of a drug’s total value, and it is not inappropriate to
consider such long-term, net benefits in its price.101 True
pharmaceutical innovation alleviates the burden that chronic
treatments have on insurers, costs that are otherwise passed
along to all consumers. A real-world application of this
97 Id.
98 See Pfizer, Inc. v. Int’l Rectifier Corp., No. CV 73-58, 1983 WL 62442, at *6
(C.D. Cal. June 30, 1983).
99 Id. (“The object, therefore, of every drug manufacturing company . . . is to
sell the physician on the efficacy and safety of its particular drug.”).
100 See DRANOVE ET AL., supra note 82, at 8 (A drug’s profit margin “is determined
by a number of factors including the efficacy of the product compared to the next most
effective treatment.”).
101 “[W]hen innovation leads to the discovery and development of an important
new medicine, then its price, in turn, should be driven by the value that it brings.” John
LaMattina, Do R&D Costs Matter When It Comes to Drug Pricing?, FORBES (May 20,
2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/johnlamattina/2015/05/20/do-rd-costs-matter-when-it-
comes-to-drug-pricing/.
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hypothetical is conveniently embodied in Sovaldi, a Hepatitis-C
treatment manufactured by Gilead Sciences and approved by
the FDA in late 2013.102 Ever since the drug came to market, it
has been the subject of much rancor for its high price tag.103
Sovaldi is a once-a-day pill, taken in combination with one
or two other drugs for twelve or twenty-four weeks, depending on
the patient’s genotype,104 with extraordinary cure rates and mild,
tolerable side effects.105 Prior to Sovaldi’s approval, the standard
of care for Hepatitis-C patients was a combination therapy of four
drugs that together embodied a treatment regimen lasting
twenty-eight to forty-eight weeks, offering between a thirty to
eighty percent cure-rate.106 Moreover, the therapy produced
miserable side effects,107 which, when coupled with its long
duration, prompted poor medication adherence, often leaving
patients needing a liver transplant to save their lives.108 Despite
fierce and widespread outrage over the drug’s $1,000 per pill price
tag,109 “the price of Sovaldi is about the same as the combined
prices of [the drugs that constituted the prior treatment method];
the cure rate is higher; the side effects are much milder; and the
therapy takes less time.”110 Sovaldi users, now in better physical
102 U.S. Food and Drug Administration Approves Gilead’s Sovaldi™ (Sofosbuvir)
for the Treatment of Chronic Hepatitis C, GILEAD (Dec. 6, 2013), http://www.gilead.com/
news/press-releases/2013/12/us-food-and-drug-administration-approves-gileads-sovaldi-sofo
sbuvir-for-the-treatment-of-chronic-hepatitis-c [https://perma.cc/Q7ZQ-BJ37] [hereinafter
FDA Approves Gilead’s Sovaldi].
103 Horvath, supra note 96.
104 FDA Approves Gilead’s Sovaldi, supra note 102; How Do I Take SOVALDI?,
SOVALDI, http://www.sovaldi.com/about-sovaldi/how-do-i-take-sovaldi [https://perma.cc/A
PV2-X9TQ].
105 See SOVALDI Combination Therapy Cure Rates in Clinical Studies, SOVALDI,
http://www.sovaldi.com/about-sovaldi/study-results [https://perma.cc/LN3P-HUEH].
106 David R. Henderson, In Defense of an “Expensive” Drug, HOOVER INST. (Apr.
30, 2015), http://www.hoover.org/research/defense-expensive-drugs [https://perma.cc/H6D
G-34QK].
107 Id.
108 Susan Heavey, U.S. Drug Industry Group Defends Price of Gilead Hepatitis
Drug, REUTERS (Apr. 10, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-hepatitis-gilead-phrma-
idUSBREA391I220140410 [https://perma.cc/3Q4K-M37B].
109 See Olga Khazan, The True Cost of an Expensive Medication, THE ATL. (Sept.
25, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2015/09/an-expensive-medications-
human-cost/407299/ [https://perma.cc/SWK4-5VRL] (“There’s a drug called Sovaldi that
works astonishingly well to cure people with the liver disease Hepatitis C. The rub? It
costs $1,000 per day for all 12 weeks of treatment.”); Carolyn Y. Johnson & Brady Dennis,
How an $84,000 Drug Got Its Price: ‘Let’s Hold Our Position . . . Whatever the Headlines,’
WASH. POST (Dec. 1, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/12/01/
how-an-84000-drug-got-its-price-lets-hold-our-position-whatever-the-headlines/ [https://
perma.cc/L9EB-BV3U] (“Gilead gained federal approval for . . . Sovaldi in late 2013 and
ultimately settled on the price of $84,000 for a 12-week course of treatment. . . . But they
also got more than they bargained for: an outpouring of outrage from the public, a
backlash from government and private payers, and political scrutiny.”).
110 Henderson, supra note 106.
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and mental shape, are able to again contribute to their families,
workplaces, and communities unencumbered by the residual
debilitating fatigue of a chronic condition. In this way, the
therapeutic value of Sovaldi is undeniably higher to patients, and
society at large, than the sum of its R&D investment.111 And its
potential to eradicate Hepatitis-C entirely112 offers a value to
society that exceeds all quantifiable bounds. Harvard health
economist David Cutler113 frames the issue in frank terms:
“Virtually every study of medical innovation suggests that
changes in the nature of medical care over time are clearly worth
the cost.”114 This larger social gain represents the true, full
therapeutic value of Sovaldi, and Gilead is justified in including
the drug’s transformative quality in its price. In the case of
Sovaldi, and other breakthrough medicines,115 R&D expenditures
are dwarfed by the therapeutic and social value inherent in the
drug. This is not to imply that every drug approved by the FDA
offers a cumulative value exponentially above its development
costs,116 but it is disingenuous to overlook this factor in a drug
price transparency effort. The NYPCTA ignores such therapeutic
value as a pricing factor, and in so doing, its implementation
could further skew the public’s already muddled understanding of
how and why prescription drugs are priced.
111 “The drug produced far better outcomes, faster, compared to the then-current
standard of care without the severe side effects that accompany interferon therapy. Before
Sovaldi, most Hep C patients weren’t treated or stopped treatment early.” Price Bomb of
Gilead, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 6, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/price-bomb-of-gilead-1449447
106 [https://perma.cc/AUK9-P7FU].
112 Zoe Mintz, The Cost of a Cure: New Drugs May Eradicate Hepatitis C But Are
They Worth It?, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2014), http://www.ibtimes.com/cost-cure-new-
drugs-may-eradicate-hepatitis-c-are-they-worth-it-1570671 [https://perma.cc/BFN9-X3JQ].
113 David M. Cutler: Harvard College Professor, Otto Eckstein Professor of Applied
Economics, HARVARD UNIV., http://scholar.harvard.edu/cutler/home [https://perma.cc/P4PB-
WBSP].
114 Peter J. Pitts, AD Hoc, MEDCITYNEWS (Jan. 31, 2011), http://medcitynews.
com/2011/01/ad-hoc/ [https://perma.cc/2W3M-QBG4].
115 “[A]dvances in HIV/AIDS therapies from 1987 to 2010 helped avoid a
staggering 862,000 premature deaths in the United States and delivered $615 billion in
gains to the U.S. economy by enabling patients to lead productive lives.” Joel White,
Prescription Drugs: Innovative Medicines Are Worth the Price, STARTRIBUNE (Sept. 3, 2015),
http://www.startribune.com/prescription-drugs-innovative-medicines-are-worth-the-price/32
4234951/ [https://perma.cc/U4WM-T5RU]. In the oncology realm, while the scope and
duration of treatment and patient outcomes provided by different cancer drugs vary widely,
“[b]etween 1988 and 2000, treatment advances saved 23 million life-years and $1.9 trillion
in the United States.” Id.
116 Few drugs offer the absolute, curative relief of Sovaldi, and the FDA “has
approved some pricey drugs based on clinical trials showing they extend life for just a
matter of days.” Rebecca Robbins, How Much Is an Extra Month of Life Worth? Drug
Makers Face Pressure to Calculate, STAT (Feb. 25, 2016), https://www.statnews.com/201
6/02/25/drug-prices-decisions/ [https://perma.cc/AWN8-GFHS].
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4. The Power of Hope
Beyond the fairly tangible social value of curing the
sick, new medicines may also provide intangible value through
hope.117 This benefit does not even require an FDA approval to
be unlocked, as the “innovation engine . . . laboring to produce
new agents,” provides “great comfort” to the general
population, especially those predisposed to certain medical
conditions.118 Hope, and the knowledge that an entire industry
devotes tremendous resources, both financial and intellectual, to
curing disease, can extend benefits to all of society through
efficiency gains and the general alleviation of the various
psychological and social implications of living in fear of a
hypothetical diagnosis.
Prescription drug prices are calculated based on a wide
array of variables, only one of which is the R&D expended to
bring a drug to market. Additionally, pharmaceutical companies
occupy a unique niche in the American corporate landscape,
operating under tremendous regulatory constraints to develop
products that can provide value far beyond simply fixing what
ails its customers. As a result, attaching an appropriate price to
a drug requires an analysis deeper than simply determining at
what margin above R&D expenditures executives would like to
record a profit. The NYPCTA, aimed at educating the American
public on the cost of bringing a prescription drug to market,119
overlooks the intricacies of the pricing equation by vastly
simplifying the issue and proffering the disingenuous inference
that a drug’s price should be based solely on the R&D costs
directly associated with the drug’s path to FDA approval. While
disclosure of company R&D would give the public a baseline at
which it could begin to critically think about and debate drug
pricing, the bill as written has no intention to truly educate on
industry realities, and its fundamental mischaracterization of
pharmaceutical pricing efforts ensures that no real change
would result from its implementation.
117 Rena Conti et al., New Cures Require New Pricing Policies, HEALTH AFFAIRS
BLOG (Apr. 16, 2015), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/04/16/new-cures-require-new-
pricing-policies/ [https://perma.cc/QF96-P8XA].
118 Id.
119 See S. 5338A, 2015–2016 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2015).
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II. A RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW OF THENYPCTA: HOW A
LEGITIMATE STATE PURPOSE IS FRUSTRATED BY THE
VERYMEANS PROMULGATED TO ACHIEVE IT
States are afforded incredibly broad discretion in
regulating the economic activities of commercial enterprises
within its territories. A regulation of economic activity by a
state is subject only to minimal scrutiny; it requires nothing
more than that the challenged legislation be “rationally related
to a legitimate state interest.”120 By “rational,” the United
States Supreme Court does not require that a given regulation
be precisely proportional to whatever public injustice or
inefficiency it seeks to correct,121 nor does it mandate the
legislation even be particularly wise.122 Accordingly, businesses
seeking the protections of the Constitution for a seemingly
undue state burden on their ability to operate are rarely
successful in such a challenge; however, “[r]ational basis review,
while deferential, is not ‘toothless.’”123 And, as currently drafted,
the NYPCTA is particularly vulnerable to the fangs of minimal
scrutiny given its mischaracterization of the pharmaceutical
industry’s pricing strategies.
A. Pharmaceutical Cost Transparency Is a Legitimate State
Interest
The constitutionality of economic regulation by a state
or the federal government has historically been a topic ripe for
debate and one that has been heavily litigated at all levels of
courts throughout the United States. “Economic due process,” a
laissez-faire system under which “the Supreme Court frequently
struck down state laws124 on the grounds that the end the state
120 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
121 An economic regulation is not unconstitutional “merely because the
classifications made by its laws are imperfect. If the classification has some ‘reasonable
basis,’ it does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification ‘is not made
with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.’” Dandridge
v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (quoting Lindsley v. Nat. Carbonic Gas Co., 220
U.S. 61, 78 (1911)).
122 “[I]t is not within our authority to determine whether the Congressional
judgment expressed . . . is sound or equitable, or whether it comports well or ill with the
purposes of the Act. . . . ‘Our concern here, as often, is with power, not with wisdom.’”
Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611 (1960) (quoting Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619,
644 (1937)).
123 Peoples Rights Org., Inc. v. City of Columbus, 152 F.3d 522, 532 (6th Cir.
1998) (citing Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976)).
124 See, e.g., Adkins v. Children’s Hosp. (The Minimum Wage Case), 261 U.S.
525, 545 (1923) (“That the right to contract about one’s affairs is a part of the liberty of
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sought to achieve with its economic regulation was itself
illegitimate, regardless of the means or process chosen to
achieve that end,”125 reached its zenith at the turn of the
twentieth century following the Court’s infamous decision in
Lochner v. New York.126 But by the late 1930s, the Court had
“dispensed entirely with the Lochner doctrine”127 in favor of the
far more deferential rational basis framework still utilized
today.128 In seeking to overturn an economic regulation,
challengers may allege the law violates the remnants of
economic substantive due process via the Fifth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause129 or, if it creates a classification, that the
resulting disparity between regulated and unregulated groups
impinges upon equal protection liberties under the Fourteenth
Amendment.130 Regardless of which constitutional provision is
alleged to be infringed, the stringency imposed upon the
regulation by the rational basis standard is the same.131
While a state actor is not required to provide its actual
purpose or rationale in enacting a regulation with the effect of
creating a classification,132 the United States Supreme Court
does mandate that “a purpose may conceivably or ‘may
reasonably have been the purpose and policy’ of the relevant
governmental decisionmaker.”133 In regards to the NYPCTA, the
bill’s purpose is stated fairly unequivocally: “It is the intent of
the individual protected by . . . [the Fifth Amendment’s due process] clause is settled by the
decisions of this court and is no longer open to question. . . . Within this liberty are contracts
of labor employment.”); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 21 (1915) (“To ask a man to agree in
advance to refrain from affiliation with the union while retaining a certain position of
employment is not to ask him to give up any part of his constitutional freedom.”); Adair v.
United States, 208 U.S. 161, 190 (1908) (“There are rights which, when exercised in a
private business, may not be disturbed or limited.”).
125 Mark C. Christie, Economic Regulation in the United States: The
Constitutional Framework, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 949, 958 (2006).
126 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
127 Christie, supra note 125, at 959.
128 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
129 This type of challenge would undoubtedly be an uphill battle, to say the least,
as a plaintiff must “traverse ‘unusually inhospitable legal terrain’ because the Supreme
Court has not invalidated an economic statute on substantive due process grounds
since . . . 1935.” In re Blue Diamond Coal Co., 79 F.3d 516, 521 (6th Cir. 1996) (internal
citations omitted).
130 “[R]estraints on judicial review have added force where the legislature must
necessarily engage in a process of line-drawing.” FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S.
307, 315 (1993) (quoting U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980)).
131 See Anthony B. Sanders, Comment, Exhumation Through Burial: How
Challenging Casket Regulations Helped Unearth Economic Substantive Due Process in
Craigmiles v. Giles, 88 MINN. L. REV. 668, 674 (2004) (“The Court uses virtually identical
language to describe each test.”).
132 Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 15 (1992) (citing Fritz, 449 U.S. at 179).
133 Id. (quoting Allied Stores, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 528 (1959)).
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the legislature to make information available to the public about
the cost of ultra-high-priced pharmaceuticals, in order to make
pharmaceutical pricing as transparent as the pricing in other
sectors of the health care industry.”134 Despite this purported
intent, it is widely presumed that the real goal of the NYPCTA
and other similar transparency bills is to “shame [drug]
companies into restraining their price increases and provide state
officials with information to determine what action to take.”135
Both the stated and presumed purposes of the NYPCTA
almost certainly serve what a court would consider legitimate
state purposes. The bar a governmental actor must hurdle to
prove its regulation serves a legitimate purpose is low;
however, the Supreme Court has never explicitly “elaborated
on the standards for determining what constitutes a ‘legitimate
state interest.’”136 Despite this silence, the Court has “made
clear . . . that a broad range of governmental purposes and
regulations satisfies these requirements.”137 Further, a
legislature is not required “to articulate its reasons for enacting
a statute, [thus] it is entirely irrelevant for constitutional
purposes whether the conceived reason for the challenged
distinction actually motivated the legislature.”138 While all that
is required to pass constitutional muster is a conceivable
purpose, however, “[t]he Supreme Court, employing rational
basis review, has been suspicious of a legislature’s circuitous
path to legitimate ends when a direct path is available.”139
Thus, unless the NYPCTA’s path to lower drug prices was
134 S.B. 5338-A, 2015–2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2015).
135 See Runaway Drug Prices, supra note 18; see also Yevgeniy Feyman, Vermont’s
Wrongheaded Drug Price ‘Transparency’ Bill Misses the Mark, FORBES (June 10, 2016),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/theapothecary/2016/06/10/vermonts-wrongheaded-drug-price-
transparency-bill-misses-the-mark/#d3dbc845ed52 (“[L]egislators simply want lower
drug prices across the board (with an added bonus of shaming drugmakers, of course).”);
Michael Ollove, High Drug Prices Prompt Demands for Transparency, THE PEW
CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Mar. 7, 2016), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/
blogs/stateline/2016/03/07/high-drug-prices-prompt-demands-for-transparency [https://
perma.cc/Z2F7-D6P8] (“By talking about pricing and transparency . . . lawmakers may
pressure the industry into talking with policymakers, health plans and others with a stake
in health care about ‘how to make sure tomorrow’s breakthrough drugs are affordable and
accessible to the patients who need them.’”); Emily Wasserman, States’ Efforts to Fight
Skyrocketing Costs Pose ‘Modest Risk to Pharma’: Report, FIERCE PHARMA (Apr. 22, 2016),
http://www.fiercepharma.com/pharma/states-efforts-to-fight-skyrocketing-costs-pose-mod
est-risk-to-pharma-report [https://perma.cc/Z6H3-3A6B] (“The ‘shame’ alone in sharing
this information is not a strong enough mechanism for pharma to start to address
prices . . . .”).
136 Nollan v. Cal Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987).
137 Id. at 834–35.
138 FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993).
139 Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 227 (6th Cir. 2002).
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deemed too suspiciously meandering for a court’s liking, it is
irrelevant whether the bill’s true intent is to merely educate
the public on drug development costs or publicly shame
pharmaceutical companies into lowering drug prices. It is
highly likely a court would find that a state, armed with the
power to preserve the public health,140 is acting entirely within
its powers to ensure that its citizenry is armed with knowledge
of an industry vital to its health and has reasonable access to
affordable medicines.
Recently, in Sorrell v. I.M.S. Health, Inc.,141 the United
States Supreme Court overturned a Vermont regulation
restricting the ability of pharmacies to sell physician
prescribing information obtained from its customers’
prescriptions to the marketing teams of pharmaceutical
companies.142 Drug makers, in turn, used such information to
personally tailor sales representatives’ promotional messaging
to physicians during sales calls in a process called “detailing,”143
which has been found to increase health care costs.144 The
Court, in striking down the law, nonetheless held that
“Vermont’s stated policy goals [of, among other things, seeking
to lower overall state health care costs] may be proper.”145 Thus,
the named goal of the NYPCTA to simply educate the public on
the cost of bringing a drug to market, without explicitly
advocating for lower drug prices, is assuredly a proper state
purpose. Moreover, the inquiry would likely end there because “a
legislative choice is not subject to courtroom factfinding and may
be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or
empirical data.”146 In light of the great latitude afforded both
states and the federal government by courts in determining
whether a regulation’s end is legitimate, especially in the public
health domain where individual liberty is not impinged upon,147
140 See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905) (“[T]he police power
of a State must be held to embrace, at least, such reasonable regulations established
directly by legislative enactment as will protect the public health.”).
141 Sorrell v. I.M.S. Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011).
142 Id. at 557.
143 Id. at 557–61.
144 Id. at 561.
145 Id. at 577.
146 FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993).
147 “Public health seeks not merely the aggregation of individual satisfaction
but, rather, the common good. Accordingly, individual rights are constantly in tension
with communitarian interests.” Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, The Public’s Right to Health:
When Patient Rights Threaten the Commons, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1335, 1344–45 (2009)
(footnotes omitted).
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the NYPCTA is likely well within constitutional bounds from a
state policy perspective.
Regardless of which purpose is analyzed given that both
are legitimate, it then becomes the function and practical effect
of the bill that renders it irrational.148 If the stated purpose of
the NYPCTA is accepted, its means can hardly be said to
accomplish its goal. By strictly tying R&D costs to drug price, it
ignores the intricacies of the industry and pricing practices.
And by so doing, the bill acts in seemingly direct contravention
of its aim at educating the public. Further, if one accepts its
hidden motive (shaming pharmaceutical companies) as the real
driving force behind the bill, further irrationality within the
NYPCTA is uncovered. This is so because it is exceedingly
unlikely that pharmaceutical companies would adjust their
pricing methods in response to a bill that creates a false inference
about how drug prices are initially determined, all while in a
quest to educate the public on the genesis of such prices.
B. The NYPCTA’s Means Are Logically Disconnected from
Its Intended End(s)
When viewed from beyond the specialized realm of a
constitutional, economic due process framework and its
accompanying rigor and relative predictability, the goals of the
NYPCTA are indeed proper.149 The seemingly ever-rising cost of
prescription drugs and health care in general150 is an issue that
affects every American, regardless of political affiliation, and one
that played a prominent role in the early stages of the 2016
presidential election.151 The NYPCTA, as well as the transparency
148 See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 461–63 (1981)
(“[T]he purposes of the Act cited by the legislature . . . are legitimate state purposes.
Thus, the controversy in this case centers on the narrow issue whether the legislative
classification between plastic and nonplastic nonreturnable milk containers is rationally
related to achievement of the statutory purposes.”).
149 More than merely proper, the bill’s goals are admirable and important. While
this note levies considerable criticism towards the bill, such criticism is directed squarely
at only the means it uses to achieve a legitimate end.
150 In 2014, national health care expenditures totaled $3 trillion (or 17.5% of the
United States’ GDP), and prescription drug expenditures comprised only 9.8% of that
amount. Health Expenditures, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cd
c.gov/nchs/fastats/health-expenditures.htm [https://perma.cc/LMV2-MJW7].
151 See, e.g., Linda Girgis, Will a Healthcare Hero Rise Out of the Election of
2016?, MEDCITY NEWS (Aug. 10, 2015), http://medcitynews.com/2015/08/election-2016-
healthcare/ [https://perma.cc/26HP-HE8E]; Jaimy Lee, Pharma CEOs Defend R&DModel
to Investors, MED. MKTG. &MEDIA (Nov. 4, 2015), http://www.mmm-online.com/corporate/
pharma-ceos-defend-rd-model-to-investors/article/451784/?DCMP=EMCMMM_Newsbrief
&spMailingID=12869658&spUserID=MjMyNDE1NjYwNgS2&spJobID=660268706&spR
eportId=NjYwMjY4NzA2S0 [https://perma.cc/3A3C-GB43] (“The Turing controversy, as
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bills introduced in other states after which New York’s was
modeled,152 understand this. The intentions of such legislation,
while no doubt tainted to some degree by party politics,
nonetheless appear generally pure. Unfortunately for the various
drafters and proponents of pharmaceutical transparency bills, the
constitutional analysis of their work does not end at the
legitimacy of its purpose. Legitimate state goals must still be
achieved by rational means, and the irrationality of the
NYPCTA’s regulations becomes apparent upon an examination of
the bill’s mechanics in the context of standard pharmaceutical
industry pricing practices.
Because rational basis review is extremely deferential,
instances of courts overturning a federal or state-based regulation
of business are “by far the exception”153 and, when one does occur,
the legal community, as well as free-market, conservative, and
libertarian commentators take notice.154 Publicity surrounding a
recent judicial determination of state regulatory overreach in the
well as fresh criticism of Valeant Pharmaceuticals’ pricing practices, has turned what was
once a fringe issue into a broad political topic.”); Noam N. Levey, How the Debate over
Healthcare Is Changing—Just in Time for the 2016 Election, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2015),
http://www.latimes.com/nation/politics/la-na-politics-healthcare-campaign-20151007-story.h
tml [https://perma.cc/EAL9-C34C]. Following the 2015–16 primary campaign season, the
height of which coincided neatly with the public outcry against Martin Shkreli and his
subsequent federal indictment, the issue of high pharmaceutical prices seemingly
received less general election campaign trail lip service, likely due in no small part to
Bernie Sanders’s absence from the Democratic ticket. Interestingly, the pharmaceutical
industry seemed to favor a Hillary Clinton presidency over a Donald Trump
administration, at least based on campaign donations she received from the industry.
Said one analyst in March 2016: “Hillary would probably be positive at this point
because at least her policies are identifiable, understandable and likely to get toned
down somewhat.” Meg Tirrell & Leanne Miller, Despite Her Rhetoric, Big Pharma Likes
Hillary, CNBC (Mar. 10, 2016), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/03/10/despite-her-rhetoric-big-
pharma-likes-hillary.html [https://perma.cc/U5MT-U4E4]. Regardless of how industry
insiders rationalized a Clinton administration’s impact on the industry, biotechnology
stocks suffered considerably during the protracted campaign season, a trend that
reversed sharply in the days immediately following Trump’s surprise election night
victory. Nathan Vardi, The Great Donald Trump Trade: Biotech Stocks, FORBES (Nov. 9,
2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/nathanvardi/2016/11/09/the-great-donald-trump-trade-
biotech-stocks/#1e9ccf957807.
152 “New York is the latest state to introduce a ‘pharmaceutical cost
transparency act,’ following five others—California, Oregon, Massachusetts, North
Carolina, and Pennsylvania.” Sullivan, New York Introduces Pharmaceutical Cost
Transparency Bill, supra note 15.
153 See Sanders, supra note 131, at 678.
154 See Richard Epstein, California Court Stunner: Something Fails the
Rational Basis Test, RICOCHET (June 11, 2010), https://ricochet.com/archives/california-
court-stunner-something-fails-the-rational-basis-test/ [https://perma.cc/MWY8-JL88] (“[A]ny
decision that strikes down economic regulation under the rational basis test is as rare as
the proverbial black swan.”); George Leef, Does Government Need a Good Reason for
Restricting Your Freedom?, FORBES (Oct. 26, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/george
leef/2015/10/26/does-government-need-a-good-reason-for-restricting-your-freedom/
[https://perma.cc/6SKD-TZHJ].
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hair braiding industry underscores this phenomenon, and the
case itself serves as a stark reminder that, despite rational basis
deference, the constitutional standard remains in place for a
reason: to weed out truly irrational regulation and to protect
businesses from unnecessary government interference.
In Brantley v. Kuntz,155 a Texas statute that governed
“barbering”—a blanket term for several follicular trades,
including the practice of African hair braiding—mandated that
any person wishing to perform these services must be licensed.156
Certain licensing requirements for braiding had the actual effect
of rendering compliance impossible and excluded the plaintiff
entirely from the braiding market.157 The statute required hair
braiders to obtain a license specifically for that craft called a
“Hair Braiding Specialty Certificate of Registration.”158 The
requirements necessary for a hair braiding license were
considerably less rigorous than those required to become a
licensed barber; however, the training curriculum required of
would-be braiders could only be completed at licensed barber
schools, which were mandated by law to “comply with a number
of facility and equipment requirements in order to become
licensed.”159 These facility and equipment requirements naturally
encompassed elements of the more rigorous prerequisites
demanded of barbers by the state.160 While rational and well-
meaning in the context of ensuring that Texas’s future barbers
were well-trained, the requirements were overbroad and
potentially financially crippling when applied to the very same
hair braiders already expressly exempted from such
requirements. In the face of such statutory exemptions, the
facility and equipment requirements were found to be wholly
contradictory and irrelevant, and, based on this irrationality, the
court concluded they served no legitimate purpose.161 Taken
together, the “logical disconnect inherent in”162 the regulations
constituted irrationality because “rather than logically connecting
means and ends, [the regulations] shoehorn two unlike
professions ‘into a single, identical mold, by treating hair
155 Brantley v. Kuntz, 98 F. Supp. 3d 884 (W.D. Tex. 2015).
156 Id. at 887.
157 Id. at 894.
158 Id. at 887.
159 Id. at 888.
160 Id. at 894.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 893.
344 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82:1
braiders—who perform a very distinct set of services—as if they
were [barbers].’”163
Brantley ultimately held that the regulations lacked “‘a
rational connection with . . . fitness or capacity to engage in’ hair
braiding instruction,” and, furthermore, served no legitimate
state purpose.164 Thus, the principle that a ‘logical disconnect’
within some facet of a law can help defeat the rational basis
standard is instructive in predicting how the NYPCTA would
fare under a similar attack. The bill’s simplification of the
pharmaceutical pricing paradigm is disconnected from the
reality of standard industry practice. While compliance with the
NYPCTA is not technically impossible, unlike the virtual
impossibility of compliance with the licensing conditions in
Brantley,165 the bill’s mischaracterization of domestic
pharmaceutical pricing contradicts its stated purpose of
attempting to facilitate transparency in the prescription drug
pricing process. By honing in on R&D and ignoring the totality
of factors that converge to determine a drug’s price,166 the
NYPCTA would, in an attempt to open the public’s eyes to
pharmaceutical cost strategy, actually misinform the populace.
Thus, through its chosen means, the bill would effectively produce
a result opposite of its stated goal.
The logical disconnect defect, or, at least, an analogue of
it, was inherent in U.S. Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,167
a prominent Equal Protection challenge to economic regulation
heard by the United States Supreme Court in the early 1970s. In
Moreno, a provision of the U.S. Food Stamp Act denied
participation in the program to any household in which there
resided a person unrelated to any other member of the dwelling.168
The underlying legislative intent of this seemingly arbitrary
classification was to exclude hippies, notorious for communal
living, from receiving federal assistance;169 however, the bill was
deemed unconstitutional because it overlooked the fact that many
poor families—the very population for whom the Food Stamp Act
was enacted to assist—lived in shared housing arrangements to
163 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Clayton v. Steinagel, 885 F. Supp. 2d 1212,
1215 (D. Utah 2012)).
164 Id. at 894 (quoting Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957)).
165 Id.
166 See supra Part I.
167 U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
168 Id. at 529.
169 Id. at 537 (“It is my understanding that the Congressional intent of the new
regulations are specifically aimed at the ‘hippies’ and ‘hippie communes.’”).
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defray, or at least minimize, rental costs.170 “Thus, in practical
operation, the [regulation] exclude[d] from participation in the
food stamp program, not those persons . . . ‘likely to abuse the
program,’ but, rather, only those . . . so desperately in need of aid
that they [could not] even afford to alter their living
arrangements so as to retain their eligibility.”171 Put simply, there
was a logical disconnect between the program’s purported
legislative intent and its ultimate effect.
If enacted, the NYPCTA would produce a similarly
backward result. The practical application of the bill as written
would misrepresent the prescription drug pricing process by
implying that price is directly tied to only already-incurred R&D
costs, despite the industry reality that decision makers involved
in the drug pricing process must contemplate factors beyond
merely R&D costs alone. While the stated goal of the bill is to
inform consumers and shed light on a previously opaque
process,172 the public would actually receive only selective
information that lends itself to a misleading inference likely to
accomplish little more than confusing the very citizens it
purports to educate. Such a result is the opposite of the bill’s
stated goal, and it is the only result the bill could possibly achieve
because of its fundamentally flawed perception of prescription
drug pricing policy. Surely, using ‘transparency’ to further
obfuscate an already muddy issue is logically disconnected from
the legitimate legislative goal of the NYPCTA.
Beyond the logical disconnect inherent in how its means
would frustrate its purpose entirely, the NYPCTA is also wildly
underinclusive when pharmaceutical costs are viewed as a
fraction of total national health care expenditures.
Underinclusiveness, on its own, is rarely dispositive of a finding of
a regulation’s unconstitutionality because “[t]raditional equal
protection analysis does not require that every classification be
drawn with precise ‘mathematical nicety.’”173 “[I]n practical
effect,” however, a classification must nonetheless “operate so as
rationally to further”174 its goal. The NYPCTA, whether
intentionally or not, creates a classification in imposing a
requirement upon only one division of the expansive health care
170 Id. at 537–38.
171 Id. at 538 (emphasis omitted).
172 See S.B. 5338-A, 2015–2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2015).
173 Moreno, 413 U.S. at 538; see alsoMetropolis Theatre Co. v. City of Chicago, 228
U.S. 61, 69–70 (1913) (“The problems of government are practical ones and may justify, if
they do not require, rough accommodations,—illogical, it may be, and unscientific.”).
174 Moreno, 413 U.S. at 537.
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sector. Yet in overall patient spending terms, prescription drugs
in 2012 “accounted for just 9 cents of every [patient] dollar spent
on health care.”175 If the NYPCTA really sought to decrease the
costs of the entire health care system, there are other areas
within it with far costlier implications on total national health
care spend, such as hospital, ambulance, and elder care
services,176 on which it could primarily focus its attention or, at
least, impose similar cost disclosure obligations.
The fact that the NYPCTA is underinclusive by regulating
the pharmaceutical industry while ignoring ample evidence
showing that other health care providers impose far heavier costs
on the public177 would not prove persuasive to a judge analyzing
the constitutionality of the bill.178 The NYPCTA’s
underinclusiveness, however, further highlights its limitations
as currently drafted. And when considered in tandem with the
paradoxically obfuscating effect this “transparency” bill would
have on public perception of the factors included in the drug
pricing analysis, the NYPCTA’s regulation of the pharmaceutical
industry alone, in an ostensible consumer protection effort,179 may
tip the scales toward a judicial conclusion that there is no
rational basis between the bill’s means and its end. Perhaps a
more proportional, inclusive piece of legislation—one also
regulating the other providers and professionals within the health
care sector—would ensure that its required disclosures actually
have the effect of educating the public on health care costs.
A judicial finding that the NYPCTA is unconstitutional is
unlikely. But the fact that it is not inconceivable that the bill
could join the constitutional short list of commercial regulations
175 Robert Zirkelbach, The Reality of Prescription Medicine Costs in Three Charts,
PHRMA (May 27, 2014), http://www.phrma.org/catalyst/the-reality-of-prescription-medicine-
costs-in-three-charts#sthash.VWh5aCAn.dpuf [https://perma.cc/FZ4X-MFGT].
176 Michael Mandel, The Folly of Targeting Big Pharma, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 10,
2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-folly-of-targeting-big-pharma-1449792625 [https://
perma.cc/8TQN-KRDY].
177 “The single biggest driving force for increased health-care spending in the
U.S. is the rising cost of labor, not drugs. . . . [T]otal labor compensation at hospitals,
doctors’ offices, ambulatory care facilities and nursing homes has risen by roughly $270
billion since 2007 . . . .” Id.
178 See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955) (“[T]he reform
may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems
most acute to the legislative mind. The legislature may select one phase of one field and
apply a remedy there, neglecting the others.” (internal citation omitted)).
179 S.B. 5338, 2015–2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2015). The sponsor memo of the
original version of the bill offered the following as justification for cost reporting:
“Pharmaceutical companies have long maintained that the exorbitant prices are needed
in order to cover the costs associated with research, development and clinical trials.
However, . . . consumers who need these prescriptions . . . have [no] idea if what
the . . . [companies] contend is actually true.” Id. (sponsor memo).
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that have failed the rational basis standard (a dubious
distinction) underlines the various shortcomings of the
legislation. While minimal scrutiny is all that federal courts
require an economic regulation to withstand to sustain its
constitutionality, an effective pharmaceutical cost transparency
effort should still aim higher. By regulating attuned to
inexorable realities of the pharmaceutical industry, a revised bill
could be more than just a rational business regulation that
causes drug companies minor headaches; it could stand a
reasonable chance of achieving its legitimate goals.
III. AMENDING THENYPCTA
Despite its current deficiencies, the NYPCTA would require
only relatively minor amendments to its disclosure requirements to
pass constitutional muster without compromising the legislative
intent behind the bill. The fatal flaw of the act as written is its
oversimplification of the prescription drug pricing puzzle. By
implying that R&D costs are the sole contributing factor to drug
pricing, the bill falls far short of achieving its purported goal to
educate the public on the investments made by pharmaceutical
companies to develop and market innovative drugs.180
Additionally, the bill as written sweeps broadly across the entire
pharmaceutical sector, and it would benefit from granting
exemptions to certain classes of drugs for whom the disclosure
requirements make less practical sense. Finally, one area in
which the NYPCTA could regulate more stringently is in
situations where a company acquires an existing drug and
promptly raises its market price. With these fairly simple
amendments to the bill, the NYPCTA would regulate armed with
a clear understanding of prescription drug pricing factors, and,
through such knowledge, its means of regulation would represent
a rational attempt to bring transparency to pharmaceutical costs.
A. Disclosure of Investments into Failed R&D That
Preceded a Newly Approved Drug
If it were to truly educate the public, the NYPCTA must
additionally require disclosure of, or at least a disclaimer,
identifying or acknowledging the existence of, the less visible
elements that comprise the prescription drug pricing scheme,
including those costs incurred by the drug makers for failures
180 See supra Part I.
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during development. Determining a drug company’s total
expenditures on failed clinical trials or laboratory tests that
nonetheless contributed incrementally to the innovation behind
an approved drug is likely impossible to achieve with absolute
precision. This is so because of the often-amorphous nature of
preclinical expenses181 and the difficulty in assigning concrete
scientific “credit” for the innovation associated with a drug’s
approval to various failures. But while the actual dollar amount
may be ultimately elusive, pharmaceutical makers should have
a sense of the general level of R&D invested during at least the
past decade into efforts to produce a therapy for either the
actual disease state for which a new drug is approved, similar
disease states, or simply investments into the general disease
category.182 Any of these R&D efforts could have resulted in data
collection, trial and error, and minor breakthroughs that
indirectly paved the way for an understanding and harvesting
of the science behind a drug efficacious and tolerable enough to
be granted FDA approval.
Reference to these efforts, whether or not absolute
investment figures are available, would at a minimum signal to
the general public that the process of innovation likely began
well before the testing and development of only those molecules
alive in a newly approved prescription medicine. Other large-
scale or high-profile developmental failures in different disease
categories that may not have any apparent causal nexus to the
science behind a newly approved drug are also highly relevant to
the price assigned to it; accordingly, an indication of such sunk
costs is also appropriate in the context of a pricing transparency
effort. This holistic representation of the full developmental
lifecycle has the potential to truly educate the public on the
expenses that justify the prices of new drugs.
B. Acquisition Cost Disclosure and Public Notice Period for
Post-Acquisition Price Increases
A further provision to effect transparency would require—
if a pharmaceutical company acquired a drug from a smaller
181 “[S]ubstantial expenditures incurred prior to clinical testing cannot be
directly linked to work on specific compounds.” Graham, supra note 50.
182 For example, an approval for a drug that treats a specific form of leukemia may
have been made possible by insights gained in the earlier failure of a therapy that had been
intended to treat the same type of leukemia, a different form of leukemia or other blood
cancer, a different form of cancer, or another disease entirely. The costs associated with any
such failure, regardless of the initial objective, are relevant in determining R&D spend.
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developer or bought the developer itself either post-approval or
during the development stage—not only public disclosure by the
purchaser of the cost, to the penny, of that transaction, but also
advanced public notice of any planned price raises of acquired
drugs following the purchase. The NYPCTA could both educate
and protect patients by imposing stringent reporting rules on
firms looking for a quick payday in such a manner. This provision
would result in far greater transparency than mandating only
immediate R&D disclosure because the actual value of a drug to a
company—what the company paid for the rights to manufacture
and sell the drug—would be readily available. Based on existing
prescribing patterns if the acquired drug is already FDA-
approved, or the size of the prospective patient population for a
drug still in clinical trials,183 the public would have a snapshot of a
drug maker’s financial position following an acquisition, and an
idea of at what price the drug must be made available for the
company to profit off of its investment. Through such
transparency, an informed debate as to how high these profit
margins should be could ensue.
As currently drafted, the NYPCTA does include “costs
for the purchase of patents, [and the] licensing or acquisition of
any corporate entity owning any rights to the drug while in
development” as expenses requiring disclosure.184 Additionally,
the bill accounts for disclosure of pre-acquisition R&D costs
incurred by a target pharmaceutical company so that the buyer
cannot simply point to the transaction costs (if the buyer believed
its purchase was a bargain) plus the expenses associated with
stewarding the drug to the FDA’s finish line as the price of
innovation.185 Acquisition costs certainly merit heightened
prominence in an effective pharmaceutical transparency bill, but
the NYPCTA requires a more detailed drafting to fully protect
consumers and ensure pricing transparency in a corporate
combination scenario.
183 Newsweek noted the intuitive relationship between patient population and
price, especially in regards to specialty drugs, thus: “[D]ue to the smaller patient
populations and higher development costs, the cost of creating the drugs must be
spread over a smaller population of people needing the treatment, which increases the
price.” Grace-Marie Turner, Should Drug Prices Be Capped?, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 19,
2015), http://www.newsweek.com/should-drug-prices-be-capped-407045 [https://perma.
cc/7QBD-H5FE].
184 S.B. 5338A, 2015-2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2015).
185 The bill requires disclosure of “the total costs of clinical trials and other
regulatory costs paid by the manufacturer, and separately, the total costs of clinical trials
and other regulatory costs paid by any predecessor in the development of the drug.” Id.
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If an acquirer does intend to raise the price on a currently
approved drug, that new, higher price should also be disclosed
ahead of its implementation. The specifics of this advance notice
period may be determined based on what a reasonable amount of
time necessary to trigger public debate on, or at least awareness
of, the price hike would require.186 This type of disclosure would
target truly predatory pricing schemes by ensuring they are
exposed and served up to both the public and various enforcement
mechanisms on a naked platter lacking the protections that
previously enabled disingenuous executives to shield such
parasitic efforts from condemnation and scorn.
Under such a rule, Turing Pharmaceuticals, and its CEO,
Martin Shkreli, would have been taken to task by a diligent
public for a “fifty-fold price increase”187 of the newly acquired, but
decades-old, drug Daraprim188 before its new pricing scheme was
ever implemented. In the case of Turing, Shkreli instituted a
“gigantic overnight increase in the price of a 62-year-old drug that
is the standard of care for treating a life-threatening parasitic
infection.”189 To both Shkreli’s dismay and surprise,190 furor did
186 Vermont recently enacted a transparency bill with similar consumer protection
aims, although in practice it sweeps far more broadly and, seemingly, randomly than that of
the hypothetical notice mechanism described above. This bill requires
state health care regulators to develop an annual list of fifteen drugs for which
“significant health care dollars” are spent and where the wholesale acquisition
costs (i.e., list prices) rose by fifty percent or more over the previous five-year
period, or for which the list prices rose by fifteen percent or more over a twelve-
month period. . . .
Select manufacturers will then need to disclose “all the factors that have
contributed to a price increase” and justify the price increase to the Attorney
General’s office, which could take companies to civil court if they decline to
provide the requested information. Each violation also carries a $10,000 penalty.
Thomas Sullivan, Vermont Governor Signs Drug Price Transparency Bill, POLICY &
MED. (June 9, 2016), http://www.policymed.com/2016/06/vermont-governor-signs-drug-
price-transparency-bill.html [https://perma.cc/BQ8A-LK7H]. Chief among the many
differences between Vermont’s new legislative effort and a notice period on post-
acquisition drug price hikes is that, in the latter case, the public is given a voice that it
can choose to use or to remain on the sidelines, whereas in Vermont, state actors with
unknown motivations are granted wide latitude to determine whether a drug’s price is, in
their mind and based on an as yet undefined value proposition, justified. See Feyman,
supra note 135 (“Based on Vermont’s prior legislative escapades—looking to allow the
importation of drugs from Canada—it would seem that legislators simply want lower
drug prices across the board (with an added bonus of shaming drugmakers, of course).”).
187 Lowe, supra note 63.
188 See Ross, supra note 91.
189 Andrew Pollack, Drug Goes from $13.50 a Tablet to $750, Overnight, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 20, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/21/business/a-huge-overnight-
increase-in-a-drugs-price-raises-protests.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/6A7D-83KY].
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eventually arise over his blatant cash grab. Under an amended
NYPCTA, however, patients and physicians—having been made
aware of the planned raise well before it took effect—would not
have been blindsided and put immediately on the defensive by an
instantaneous, crippling price increase.
Shkreli is an almost cartoonish villain and a convenient
face for the industry’s detractors to personify as all that is evil
and predatory about “Big Pharma.” The rise and fall of Martin
Shkreli, however, will more likely be remembered as a cautionary
Icarian tale of greed and hubris, serving as a warning for future
entrepreneurs to not fly too closely to the sun on wings made of
arbitrarily pumped-up pharmaceutical profits. His actions,
moreover, represent an extreme case of corporate abuse of the
pharmaceutical sphere in the private American health care
market, and—given the extreme backlash that they generated—it
is unlikely that another company will seek to replicate such an
overt feat of greed in the near future.191
This does not change the reality that overnight drug price
increases of any size pose a considerable danger to patients.192
When a price raise occurs solely as a result of a corporate
acquisition, a notice period would arm the public, as well as its
government representatives and advocates, with substantial
leverage to attempt to block or delay its implementation rather
than being forced to garner media attention and inspire
grassroots condemnation of the new price after having already
190 In justifying the price increase based on Daraprim’s relatively light usage
and attempting to re-classify the drug as “specialty,” Shkreli contended that “[i]t really
doesn’t make sense to get any criticism for this.” Id.
191 “If there’s a bright spot for those who think Shkreli’s actions are
unconscionable, it’s that the attention paid to the Daraprim price increase may spell an end
to the whole practice. ‘He basically ruined the concept for other companies,’ one biotech
banker says.” Bethany McLean, Everything You Know About Martin Shkreli Is Wrong—Or
Is It?, VANITY FAIR (Dec. 18, 2015), http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2015/12/martin-shkreli-
pharmaceuticals-ceo-interview [https://perma.cc/HP5Q-HK4F]. This is made ever more
likely by Shkreli’s December 2015 arrest by federal authorities for securities fraud. See
Christie Smythe & Keri Geiger, Shkreli, Drug Price Gouger, Denies Fraud and Posts
Bail, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 17, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/features/2015-martin-
shkreli-securities-fraud/ [https://perma.cc/3S2H-DGW2]. His arrest, unfortunately, was
not an instance of karmic retribution, as the FBI had begun investigating Shkreli in 2014,
well before he raised the price of Daraprim, on allegations of fraudulent activities he
undertook in connection with a hedge fund he previously managed. See id.
192 “[W]hile more conventional companies do not typically triple or quadruple
prices overnight, they do often raise them year after year at a rate far faster than
inflation. . . . They now are concerned that innovation will be undermined by a reaction
to price increases imposed by companies like Turing and Valeant.” Andrew Pollack &
Sabrina Tavernise, Valeant’s Drug Price Strategy Enriches It, but Infuriates Patients and
Lawmakers, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/05/business/
valeants-drug-price-strategy-enriches-it-but-infuriates-patients-and-lawmakers.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/LZJ3-DCDJ].
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been subjected to its bite. Such leverage would take the form of
the noise resulting from an angry public,193 which could compel
the seller to reconsider its new price point. If the prospect of poor
public relations fails to force a price reduction, the ensuing outcry
would still alert the manufacturers of branded competitor drugs
to the opportunity to increase their own market shares and polish
their images by undercutting a deeply unpopular price. In such a
manner, a public educated on prescription drug costs through a
transparency bill attuned to the inner-workings of the
pharmaceutical industry could collectively act to facilitate
sensible, proportional drug-pricing policy.
C. “Innovation Exemption” from the NYPCTA for High-
Science Molecules
Finally, the NYPCTA would benefit from relaxing its
disclosure requirements and offering exemptions to certain
classes of drugs based on the likelihood of such treatments being
the product of true innovation and scientific advance, and also
conferring considerable patient benefit. Specifically, biologics,
which, as opposed to traditional small-molecule compounds, “are
more likely to represent some form of scientific advancement,”194
are deserving of relief from the NYPCTA given that the bill’s
limitations, particularly its failure to account for a treatment’s
therapeutic value, are especially applicable to this class of drugs.
Granting such exemptions would evince an understanding on the
bill’s part of the complex differences that exist between various
types of therapies, despite the uniform subjection of all new drug
candidates to the FDA’s approval process.195 By making these
distinctions, the NYPCTA would indicate to the public that
assigning a price to a new prescription drug requires an analysis
193 Pharmaceutical executives are right to fear becoming the center of a Turing-
like controversy, and are right to prevent any such scandal from occurring. “When
scandals occur, they have a negative impact on companies that are doing things right.
The subsequent public outcry tends to harm the committed, experienced companies, as
politicians paint all health care companies with the same brush.” Bill George, Meet
Health Care’s Major Spoilers: Theranos, Valeant, and Turing Pharmaceuticals, HUFF.
POST (May 12, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bill-george/meet-health-cares-
major-s_b_9894126.html [https://perma.cc/K9VR-TYJQ]. Accordingly, the incentive
would be high for companies to responsibly price recently acquired drugs such that the
notice period does not generate negative publicity.
194 See DRANOVE ET AL., supra note 82, at 30.
195 “Since 1938, every new drug has been the subject of an [FDA-]approved
NDA [New Drug Application] before U.S. commercialization.” New Drug Application,
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/how
drugsaredevelopedandapproved/approvalapplications/newdrugapplicationnda/default.
htm [https://perma.cc/S4FN-M3WC] (last updated Mar. 29, 2016).
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deeper than simply pricing according to R&D expenditure,
thereby shedding more light on a very complicated process.
Biologics “are large and complex, often consisting of
heterogeneous mixtures,”196 and, thus, their development timelines
are often more protracted and expensive than those of small-
molecule drugs.197 Since reproducibility of biologics is incredibly
difficult, if not downright impossible “without intimate knowledge
of and experience with the innovator’s process,”198 there is minimal
danger of a newly approved biologic being merely a “me-too”
product representing either little or no innovation on the part of its
developer. Therefore, it is likely that the inherent therapeutic
value of biologics is, on the average, higher than that of small-
molecule drugs being introduced into already crowded
marketplaces.199 By no means is this a universal rule; however,
the NYPCTA’s failure to distinguish in any way between drug
classes and types belies its misperception of pharmaceutical
output as a homogenizing process.
If a blanket exemption for biologics were too broad, a
slightly more pared-down proposal would seek a provision within
the NYPCTA granting immunity to novel, first-in-class therapies200
or to drugs granted New Chemical Entity (NCE) status201 upon
196 Small Molecule Versus Biological Drugs, GABI ONLINE (June 29, 2012),
http://www.gabionline.net/Biosimilars/Research/Small-molecule-versus-biological-drugs
[https://perma.cc/MAF6-NZK5].
197 “Manufacturing of biologicals is more challenging than for traditional small
molecule drugs. Even minor changes in manufacturing process can cause significant
changes in efficacy or immunogenicity.” Id.; see also Lacie Glover,Why Are Biologic Drugs
So Costly?, U.S. NEWS &WORLD REPORT (Feb. 6, 2015), http://health.usnews.com/health-
news/health-wellness/articles/2015/02/06/why-are-biologic-drugs-so-costly [https://perma.
cc/TTJ9-Y4AG] (“At the molecular level, . . . [biologics are] usually larger and much more
complex than regular drugs. . . . It’s just not cheap to produce medicine from living cells
with today’s technology.”).
198 How Do Drugs and Biologics Differ?, BIOTECHNOLOGY, INNOVATION, ORG.,
http://www.bio.org/articles/how-do-drugs-and-biologics-differ [https://perma.cc/6RY4-VUUT].
199 “[T]he big advantage of . . . [biologics] is their specificity: they do only what
they are supposed to do, rarely causing the sort of side-effects that are frequently
discovered in conventional, small-molecule drugs, and lead to them being abandoned.”
Going Large, ECONOMIST (Jan. 3, 2015), http://www.economist.com/news/business/2163
7387-wave-new-medicines-known-biologics-will-be-good-drugmakers-may-not-be-so-good
[https://perma.cc/MM6Y-D9NC].
200 “A first-in-class product is associated with the greatest risk [of clinical trial
failure or FDA rejection] as it requires identifying a new target, and subsequently
developing a therapeutic compound for that target and validating the target
mechanism for disease intervention in human[s].” Herren Wu, Balancing a Biologics
Pipeline Portfolio, DRUG DISCOVERY WORLD (Spring 2011), http://www.ddw-online.com/
drug-discovery/p142736-balancing-a-biologics-pipeline-portfolio-spring-11.html [https://
perma.cc/9R5S-FDEE].
201 A new drug is entitled to an NCE designation if it “contain[s] no active
moiety that has been approved in a prior application.” Amarin Pharms. Ir. Ltd. v. FDA,
106 F. Supp. 3d 196, 200 (D.C. Cir. 2015). The FDA defines ‘active moiety’ as “the
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FDA approval. Since a first-in-class or NCE drug by its very nature
represents some sort of innovation or breakthrough within its
disease category,202 it can be inferred that its development process
was not aided by advances or knowledge already well established
within its scientific niche. Thus, R&D expenditure was likely
higher,203 and the risk of failure was likely greater;204 the end
product of which provides a new treatment avenue for patients,
likely filling an unmet need for greater efficacy and positive
outcomes in the category.205 Relief from the NYPCTA is appropriate
for these types of drugs as their developmental costs would be
particularly obscured by the bill’s disclosure mandates.
So as not to override other areas of necessary
amendment to the NYPCTA, the “innovation exemption”
should apply only to the forced disclosure of a new drug’s actual
R&D spend in the laboratory and during clinical trials; not to
any acquisitions made during the development of the
innovative therapy. If the compound was acquired from
another company, or if that other company itself was acquired
for purposes of obtaining the compound, these costs would still
be subject to the bill’s disclosure requirements and, if
applicable, an advance public notice period, as discussed above.
Prior to an FDA approval, acquisition costs would be disclosed
publicly, and, based on the scope of the transaction, the public
would have a sense of how the drug was valued by its
purchaser at the stage of development at which it was
acquired. If a compound were acquired on the cheap—prior to
its being thoroughly investigated in a laboratory setting—but
eventually progressed all the way to market, the purchaser
would have shouldered the vast majority of the costs associated
with the innovation.
Conversely, an investigatory drug already steeped in
encouraging preliminary Phase 3 data would command a far
molecule or ion . . . responsible for the physiological or pharmacological action of the drug
substance.” Id. at 199.
202 As a result of innovation, “[a] first in class drug provides the manufacturer
with a period of market exclusivity free of competition from similar drugs” because
none yet exist. The Economics of Drug Discovery: ‘First in Class’ vs. ‘Best in Class’,
SEEKING ALPHA (Aug. 22, 2010), http://seekingalpha.com/article/221704-the-economics-
of-drug-discovery-first-in-class-vs-best-in-class?page=2 [https://perma.cc/NR8N-UVNB].
203 “Companies [developing a first-in-class drug] face an extra burden of proof,
more time and money to demonstrate product safety, as well as competition.” Rachel
MacDonald, Biologic Copy-Cat Drug Development Is Rising, Bringing Pharmaceutical
Companies Together, MEDILL REPORTS CHI. (May 10, 2012), http://newsarchive.medill.
northwestern.edu/chicago/news-205418.html [https://perma.cc/5D69-L9GQ].
204 Wu, supra note 200.
205 Id.
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higher price so far along in development.206 Based on the drug’s
price tag in relation to where it was in the development cycle at
the point of its purchase, the public could decide for itself whether
this perceived value is reflected fairly in the drug’s price tag or
whether its owners are now seeking to profit many times over for
the work of another. Therefore, the “innovation exemption” would
not serve as a loophole for disingenuous firms. In this way,
relaxing the sweeping nature of the NYPCTA would effect a
greater transparency that could at least further the public’s
understanding of, if not solve, the pharmaceutical pricing puzzle.
CONCLUSION
The NYPCTA nobly seeks to force pharmaceutical
companies to publicly justify the high costs of prescription drugs.
In the face of the contentious current climate surrounding the
motives and ethics of drug makers, bringing transparency to the
drug pricing analysis is a legitimate legislative goal. But
disclosure of only the types of information mandated by the
NYPCTA would not provide an accurate justification of a drug’s
cost, and publicizing these costs completely devoid of any context
of the other relevant pricing elements would only further
embitter a frustrated public against the pharmaceutical
industry. It would also obscure the true nature of the
pharmaceutical pricing process, effectively using “transparency”
to do nothing but precipitate more public confusion and
mistrust of drug companies. An imperative constitutional check
on government regulation of private businesses, while meek and
rarely successful,207 nevertheless exists in the form of rational
basis review, and the obfuscating effect the NYPCTA would
likely have on the public enables this deferential, but “not
‘toothless,’”208 standard to threaten the constitutionality of the
bill. Hence, as drafted, the NYPCTA falls short of its admirable
goal to arm the public with the information necessary to
stimulate informed debate about prescription drug costs. One
can only hope that in future discussions of the bill, the New York
State Legislature views the NYPCTA with a more discerning
206 “[T]he more developed a product is, the more it has been derisked, and thus
it is more valuable to pharma.” Asiya Giniatullina et al., Building for Big Pharma,
BIOENTREPRENEUR (Mar. 21, 2013), http://www.nature.com/bioent/2013/130301/full/bioe.
2013.3.html [https://perma.cc/Q5HZ-PK79].
207 Aaron Belzer, Putting the “Review” Back in Rational Basis Review, 41 W. ST.
U. L. REV. 339, 340 (2014).
208 See Peoples Rights Org., Inc. v. City of Columbus, 152 F.3d 522, 532 (6th Cir.
1998) (citing Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976)).
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eye—one attuned to the complexities inherent in affixing a price
to a product that engenders far more than the sum of its parts.
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